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I. Introduction
The issue of aid to the global poor has rightly claimed increasing
attention on the political and cultural agendas of the world's developed
societies.' Proposals for debt relief, like Jubilee 2000,2 are only among the
most visible attempts to increase the resources available to the world's
poorest people, most of them women and children. In this Article, I sketch
an argument for a substantial commitment of resources by developed
countries to the eradication of global poverty-an argument rooted in the so-
called "new classical natural law" theory (NCNLT). The philosophers
Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, Jr. and the legal theorists John Finnis and
Robert P. George have pioneered a revival of the moral, political, and legal
thought of Thomas Aquinas. These "new classical natural lawyers,
3
(hereinafter, clumsily, NCNLs) have sought to articulate a version of natural
law thinking that is uncompromising in its support of traditional moral
positions but also analytically rigorous and responsive to current
philosophical concerns. It is clearly relevant to the problem of public
assistance by developed to less developed countries.
I begin, in the Introduction, by emphasizing the importance of
framing this commitment in moral and not only pragmatic terms. I consider
one possible grounding for such a commitment, which I call the "Singer-
Unger thesis." Then, I lay the groundwork for my elucidation of the NCNLT
as an alternative source of support for an individual and collective moral
duty to support relief and development efforts (hereinafter, clumsily, DRD).
In Part II, I explain the basics of the NCNLT. I explain briefly how
its proponents understand basic human goods and highlight relevant features
See, e.g., JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY (2005) (setting forth ideas on ending poverty
around the world); but cf. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS
TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LrITLE GOOD (2006) (discussing various reasons
why the Western world's attempts to provide humanitarian aid fail).
2 See generally Alon Seveg, Investment: When Countries Go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and
Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 68, 77 (2003); David L. Gregory, From
Pope John Paul II to Bono/U2: International Debt Relief Initiatives "in the Name of Love," 19 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 257, 258, 268 (2001); Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation, 6
CHI. J. INT'L L. 267, 272-75 (2005); Eric A. Friedman, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long
Journey, 3 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 191 (2000).
3 Cf. Steven Macedo, The New Natural Lawyers, HARV. CRIMSON, Oct. 29, 1993, at 2
(discussing the relationship between the principles of justice and morality). The proponents of the
position prefer "new classical natural law" to "new natural law" as a label for the focus of their position.
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of their conception of practical reasoning. Then, I examine their conception
of private property, before noting key elements of their understanding of
distributive justice and attempting to suggest how this understanding follows
from their moral theory. Finally, I note their rejection of the Singer-Unger
thesis and explain how this flows from their account of property rights and
justice in distribution.
In Part I, I explore the contours of the NCNLs' alternative to the
Singer-Unger thesis. I consider the meaning of genuine need as a criterion of
distribution, since the NCNLs suggest that private consumption in excess of
genuine needs is unjust and that unneeded resources should be redistributed.
I examine the NCNLs' norms for consumption, including criteria for
distributive justice derived from the Golden Rule and the requirements of
commitments and vocations.
In the Conclusion, I recap my analysis of the NCNLs' position. I
suggest that a DRD understood as within the terms of the NCNLT can
provide a morally attractive basis for significant public financial assistance to
less-developed countries, as long as it is clear how to operationalize the
NCNLs' norms.
A. The Importance of Moral Grounding
Arguments for global financial assistance are multiple. In an ironic
reversal of the claim made by proponents of "trickle-down" economics that
"a rising tide lifts all boats," advocates of international aid who wish to
appear hard-nosed regularly note the positive consequences for developed
nations of the substantial reduction or elimination of poverty.4 All countries
will be productive participants in international trade, with healthy and
educated populations able to contribute more productively than poor and
illiterate ones to the global growth of prosperity. Global economic well-
being will minimize the occurrence of economically driven conflicts between
rich and poor countries, and thus lead to an increase in stability and security.
The absence of the economic pressures exerted by poverty will eliminate a
stimulus to ethnic, cultural, and religious conflict-conflict with the potential
to spill into the international arena. The eradication of poverty will also
remove an important impetus to environmental degradation by poor countries
4 Cf. Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in The Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-
Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 159, 161 n.4 (2000) (detailing
reasons that the Americans should be concerned with developing world debt).
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that may find it difficult or impossible to survive except by exploiting
nonrenewable resources.
It is surely in the best interests of developed societies to promote the
economic well being of people around the world. Although the benefits
deriving from global economic uplift are long-term. Over the short-term,
serious responses to global poverty may well require belt-tightening in the
developed world.5 Such belt-tightening will be particularly problematic
politically if it is-as it likely must be-undertaken as a matter of public
policy.
Private donations will certainly make a difference, as will piecemeal
policy changes like those involved in programs of debt relief. Changes in
trade relations-in particular, the elimination of subsidies and tariffs-may
substantially enhance the well-being of producers in less developed
countries. Schemes like the Tobin Tax could doubtless also provide
significant revenue for international development programs.6 However,
developed countries will likely need to employ general tax revenues to
address the problem of global poverty if sufficient resources are to be
generated and if the resultant burdens are to be fairly shared. Also, the
necessary societal commitments will likely be sustainable only if those
required to fund them are confident in their moral validity.
5 Perhaps not-perhaps meeting the problem of the poor will turn out to be profitable for
developed countries even in the short term. Cf. STUART L. HART, CAPITALISM AT THE CROSSROADS:
THE UNLIMITED BuSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN SOLVING THE WORLD'S MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS
(2005) (highlighting numerous approaches that global corporations could take in utilizing the power of the
lower class towards transforming the global economy through disruptive innovations and sustainable
industries); C. K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY
THROUGH PROFITS (2005) (advancing a new approach based on considerable case studies that
demonstrates how large corporations can use the untapped resource of the "bottom of the pyramid class"
toward considerable profit gain).
6 See Myron Frankman, Beyond the Tobin Tax: Global Democracy and a Global Currency, 581
ANNALS 62 (2002) (explaining the original purpose of the Tobin Tax on foreign exchange transactions-
to discourage speculative international financial transactions-and stating that if the tax were successful it
could generate "fabulous sums" for international development); William R. White, Note, The Tobin Tax:
A Solution To Today's International Monetary Instability?, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 3 (1999) (stating
that one of the by-products of the 1% Tobin Tax on all roundtrip currency transactions would be to raise
substantial revenue that could be used by individual nations or to fund "domestic or multilateral political
and economic activities"); Geoffrey G. B. Brow, The Tobin Tax: Turning Swords into Plowshares?, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (1998) (stating that one unintended benefit of the Tobin Tax
would be its revenue raising ability, the results of which could go to international economic development
funds, the Untied Nations, etc.); Amy Youngblood Avit, Saving The World One Currency at a Time:
Implementing the Tobin Tax, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 391 (2002) (stating that a benefit of the Tobin Tax is that
the proceeds of the tax could be used by: (1) individual countries for national use if the countries
themselves implemented the tax; (2) that the proceeds could fund international efforts to alleviate poverty;
or (3) the proceeds could be distributed directly to developing nations in the form of foreign aid if the tax
was implemented on a global basis).
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Such commitments will have greater moral weight if individuals in
developed societies are themselves responsible for contributing meaningfully
to relief and development efforts. This is simply a special case of the general
point that the moral legitimacy of redistributive (which is to say, almost all)
taxation is most evident if it is viewed as a way of fulfilling the
responsibilities taxpayers already have.7 A crucial step in justifying public
programs of resource allocation to development and relief efforts will thus be
the demonstration that such individual duties obtain.
B. The Singer- Unger Thesis
One readily available moral basis for a DRD is provided by what I
label the "Singer-Unger" thesis, defended most visibly by Peter Singer and
Peter Unger.
Singer assimilates a DRD to the more widely acknowledged moral
duty to rescue. If I have a moral obligation to save a drowning child-
presuming the only cost is, say, damage to my new suit-then, he argues, I
must, by analogy, have a moral duty to save a poor child from starvation.
This will be true as long as there are such children. Thus, it seems as if I
should devote all of my resources to the relief of global poverty except when
allocating them in other ways will be as or more productive of net global
benefit.
Singer's programmatic statement remains his essay "Famine,
Affluence, and Morality.",8 However, he has revisited the issue in a number
of contexts. In the first edition of Practical Ethics, while declining to offer a
general norm for individual donors, he suggested that readers persuaded by
his argument advocate everyone's payment of a ten percent tithe for
development and relief purposes, with the understanding that the persuaded
themselves would give a good deal more.9 In the second edition, he simply
7 It is when owners will not employ for appropriate public purposes resources effectively held in
trust for the public, or when they "cannot effectively coordinate their respective efforts" to do so, that the
state "may rightly help them to perform ... [their duties] by devising and implementing schemes of
distribution." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 173 (1981) [hereinafter LAW].
8 Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL PUB. AFF. 229 (1972).
9 See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICs (1 st ed. 1979) ("[W]e are obliged to give to the point at
which by giving more we sacrifice something of comparable moral significance. What would follow...
is that public advocacy of this standard of giving is undesirable. It would mean that in order to do the
maximum to reduce absolute poverty, we should advocate a standard lower than the amount we think
people really ought to give. Of course we ourselves-those of us who accept the original argument, with
its higher standard-would know that we ought to do more than we publicly propose people ought to do,
and we might actually give more than we urge others to give.").
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defended a ten percent minimum for everyone without a large number of
dependants, without actively arguing that a higher donation level should, in
reality, be expected of most people.' 0 In a New York Times magazine article,
he attempted a different tack, suggesting that everyone adopt a budget equal
to one identified as standard by The Conference Board, and give away
anything in excess of this amount." His own practice, he has made ruefully
clear in multiple interviews, is to give away a mere twenty percent of his
income.12
While Singer framed his initial argument in terms of thought
experiments, his own philosophical predilections are consequentialist. Peter
Unger has developed the case for an essentially unlimited global DRD at
greater length.' 3 Though Unger's arguments are intuitionist in form, their
practical results are relatively indistinguishable from those of Singer's.
Among his recommendations is that each reader give away 51% of her total
wealth for development and relief purposes.14
The Singer-Unger thesis is not dependent on any particular theory of
the sources of the global wealth gap. It does not stand or fall with the claim
that global poverty results from the abusive behavior of rich states.
Whatever the sources of poverty, for Singer and Unger, it is the
responsibility of those with resources to remedy it.
Not surprisingly, the Singer-Unger thesis has evoked negative
reactions. A number of challenges have been empirical in nature. Are there
likely to be unforeseeable consequences even to thoughtful and well-
intended relief efforts? How confident can we be about the uses to which
10 See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 246 (2d ed. 1993) ("Some families.., will find 10 per
cent a considerable strain on their finances .... No figure should be advocated as a rigid minimum or
maximum; but it seems safe to advocate that those earning average or above average incomes in affluent
societies, unless they have an unusually large number of dependents .. .ought to give a tenth of their
income to reducing absolute poverty.").
11 See Peter Singer, The Singer Solution to World Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, § 6
(Magazine), at 60 (stating that the Conference Board, a nonprofit economic research organization,
concluded that an American household with an income of $50,000 annually normally spends
approximately $30,000 annually on necessities. Consequently, anything over $30,000 is money spent on
"luxuries," not necessities, and should therefore be donated "to help the world's poor").
12 See, e.g., Debra Galant, Peter Singer Settles in, and Princeton Looks Deeper; Furor over the
Philosopher Fades Though Some Discomfort Lingers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, § 14NJ, atI (describing
how a Princeton graduate student followed "the Peter Singer[] example of donating 20 percent of his
income to charity .... ").
13 PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETrNG DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996).
14 See id. at 138 (stating that many Americans are affluent enough to be able to rather harmlessly
part with 51% of their assets. Additionally, the younger the donor, the more easily the donor can absorb
the 51% donation, as the donor "can expect that, in the years soon upcoming, [the donor] will be enjoying
a significant income, part of which is to be placed aside for.., retirement").
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donations will be put?' 5 Garrett Hardin famously argued against a general
DRD on the grounds that it was not ecologically sound to keep all of the
earth's population alive. 16 Robert Goodin17 and Paul Gomberg 8 have made
the case that what is required is not personal contributions to development
and relief efforts but rather participation in political advocacy efforts
designed to bring about society-wide policy changes.' 9 R. M. Hare, Singer's
teacher at Oxford, has also argued that, precisely on consequentialist
grounds, few of us should aspire to saintly behavior (a category in which he
clearly includes living up to Singer's proposed mandate).2 °
Such empirical arguments are likely to be interminable. As
motivators of political action, they suffer from the same difficulties as
appeals to collective self-interest: the future is simply too uncertain. Further,
the public does not tend, as a rule, to reason about moral matters in
consequentialist terms. In any case, broadly consequentialist arguments
15 Cf. David Schmidtz, Islands in a Sea of Obligation: Limits of the Duty to Rescue 3-7
(Independent Institute Working Paper 18; 2000) [hereinafter Islands], www.independent.org
/pdf/working-papers/l8_islands.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice) (stating generally that people are more likely to provide
assistance in the case of a roadside emergency than in the case of a third world famine. Some of the
potential donors' apprehension for contributing to famine in third world countries stems from prior
mishaps such as money sent to Somalia for aid that was misappropriated and instead used to purchase
guns, and grain sent to aid India that was infested with plague-carrying rats). Schmidtz directs readers to
Robert Hanna, Must We Be Good Samaritans, 28 CAN J. PHIL 453 (1998).
16 See Garrett Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: READINGS IN THEORY AND
APPLICATION 356 (Louis Pojman ed., 1974) (describing the "lifeboat" theory, which states that it is
unreasonable and harmful to try to help everyone, as resources are necessarily finite); Garrett Hardin,
Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BIOSCIENCE 561-66 (1974) (using the lifeboat ethics model to characterize
international aid efforts, or "do-gooding," as ultimately harmful to the survival of mankind).
17 See ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILrrIES (1985) (discussing various "special responsibilities towards our families, friends,
clients, compatriots and so forth" and analyzing various cases, which suggest that it is "the vulnerability of
the beneficiary rather than any voluntary commitment per se on the part of the benefactor which generates
these special responsibilities"). Cf Robert Goodin & Phillip Pettit, The Possibility of Special Duties, 16
CAN. J. PHIL. 651, 673-74 (1986) (addressing meta-duties and the relevancy of political action to meet
those duties).
18 See Paul Gomberg, The Fallacy of Philanthropy, 32 CAN. J. PHIL. 29, 61-65 (2002)
(concluding that the application of the duty to aid to the need to end poverty is incorrect, but that rather
the need to end poverty calls for larger scale solutions that emphasize the "common struggle").
19 Even if one must choose between the two, however, one might still reasonably note that the
needed investment of time and resources in political advocacy will be as overwhelmingly demanding, if
justified in the same way, by analogy with the moral duty to rescue, as the needed direct investment in
relief and development efforts.
20 See R. M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS NATURE, LIMITS, AND POINT 200-01 (1981)
[hereinafter THINKING] (stating "it would be detrimental to nearly everybody if those who are able to be
saints failed to become such, according to their capacity, "because many will never be able to accomplish
such stringent principles. It is better left to each individual to aspire to the level of saintliness of which he
or she is likely to be capable of achieving).
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 2 (2007)
about these matters suffer from the in-principle difficulties that beset all
forms of consequentialism.
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C. The New Classical Natural Law Theory as an Alternative
I want here to examine the NCNLs' provocative non-
consequentialist attempt to delineate the contours of a DRD. Their
perspective is particularly interesting because it features both an unequivocal
rejection of consequentialism and of the stance of Singer and other
consequentialists regarding a DRD, and a clear commitment to the existence
21 For criticisms of consequentialist approaches, See, e.g., ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 61-63, 67-68, 185 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that the polymorphous
character of 'pleasure' and 'happiness' renders those concepts useless to the ideology of the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of people); LAW at 111-19 (1980) (explaining the consequentiualist
approach of choosing the act that will yield the greatest net good on the whole and stating that, in the
long-run, it is "senseless" because what is 'good' is subjective, and it is futile to attempt to measure
things that differ in kind and degree: "[l]t is senseless to try to sum together the size of this page, the
number six, and the mass of this book"); JOHN M. FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 80-108 (1983)
[hereinafter ETHICS] (positing that the related theories of utilitarianism, consequentialism, and
proportionalism pose a "threat to ethics" as they are impracticable rationalizations that operate separately
from any independent moral standard); JOHN M. FNNIs, JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR., GERMAIN G. GRIsEZ,
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND REALISM 177-296 (1987) (comparing and contrasting
consequentialist arguments for and against the deterrent of nuclear war, and how this compares to
common morality's norm forbidding the killing of the innocent); GERMAIN G. GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW,
BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 111-14, 131-33 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter MORALITY] (comparing utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism, to situationism, in which
the utilitarian problem of defining the 'greatest good' is amplified by the moral values of whomever is
defining the situation); DAVID S. ODERBERG, MORAL THEORY: A NON-CONSEQUENTiAIST APPROACH
65-76, 97-101, 132-33 (2000) (contrasting the incompatibility of rights and the principle of double effect
with Peter Singer's consequentialist moral theory); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO
ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 86-87, 151-54 (1984) (contrasting reciprocity and caring against Peter
Singer's consequentialist arguments); ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 172-209 (1977)
(comparing and contrasting Hebrew-Christian common morality with consequentialism and
utilitarianism); BERNARD A. 0. WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 89-107 (2d ed.
1993) (contrasting consequentialism's focus on an action's "tendency to lead to intrinsically good or bad
states of affairs" with utilitarianism's focus on an action's tendency to promote happiness); Bernard A. 0.
Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77-150 (1973) (criticizing
utilitarianism which is defined by the author as a subset of consequentialism, a system of personal
morality, and which includes the notion that an action's virtue is measured through its consequences);
Stephen R. L. Clark, Natural Integrity and Biotechnology, in HUMAN LIVES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
CONSEQUENTIALIST BIOETHICS 58-76 (Jacqueline A. Laing & David S. Oderberg eds., 1997) (arguing, in
the context of developments in biotechnology, that rule-consequentialism is preferable to act-
consequentialism but that even rule-consequentialism produces "unacceptable consequences for ordinary
moral judgment"); Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JuRIS 21 (1978) (arguing "that
'greater good' and similar expressions necessarily lack reference in the contexts which consequentialist
theories require that they have it"); GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, FAIH AND FAITHFULNESS: BASIC THEMES
IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 89-113 (1991); ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS 298-300 (1999) [hereinafter GOODS] (offering various critiques of
consequentialsim, such as how the continuous need to evaluate goals detracts from the necessary will
power, determination and motivation to overcome obstacles).
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of substantial duties to promote the common good. They maintain that
ordinary acts of rescue are morally obligatory. They nonetheless regard the
Singer-Unger thesis as indefensible, however. In Part I, I explain the basics
of their theory and make clear why they reject this thesis.
I. The New Classical Natural Law Theory
In Part II, I outline the key elements of the NCNLT, introducing the
NCNLs' understanding of "basic human goods" and fundamental practical
principles, or "modes of responsibility." I examine the criteria of distributive
justice the NCNLs believe follow from their understanding basic goods and
practical principles. I offer an overview of their understanding of private
property, in particular. I also explain their response to the Singer-Unger
thesis, highlighting the ways in which it might be thought to flow from their
understanding of basic moral norms, distributive justice, and property rights.
A. The Basics of the New Classical Natural Law Theory
Central to the new classical natural law theory is a focus on
responsible moral action. An action is morally justifiable if it exhibits
appropriate respect for the fulfillment of the actor and those affected by her
actions. Human fulfillment can be specified with reference to a range of
human goods-life and bodily well-being, speculative knowledge, practical
reasonableness, self-integration, play, friendship, religion, and aesthetic
experience. Responsible moral action is action open to all of these goods.22
The NCNLs describe these goods as basic: every one is inherently
valuable; none is reducible to one or more other goods, or to any imagined
substrate-"happiness," say, or "pleasure." Due to the incomemen-surability
of these goods as categories, and of individual instances of particular goods,
the consequentialist injunction to maximize the good is in principle
incoherent-since it depends on maximizing the sum of all relevant goods,
or something similar-so that no variety of consequentialism can be viable.
Several principles of practical reason or "modes of responsibility,
23
govern "participation" by persons in these fundamental goods. The principle
22 An action can be open to all of the basic human goods even if it does not involve pursuit of
these goods. It will be open just so long as the actor does not choose to treat any of the goods as if it were
not fundamentally and inherently valuable.
23 For different but compatible lists of these "modes of responsibility," see GERMAIN GRISEZ &
RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALrrY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 117-53 (3d ed.
1988). Several of Grisez' modes of responsibility are: (1) "[d]o not, in response to feelings, act or refrain
from acting toward someone on the basis of a preference unless the preference is required by human
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of practical reason most significant for the issue of the DRD is the NCNLs'
distinctive version (or cluster of versions) of the Golden Rule. This principle
mandates fairness, relative impartiality; it precludes "arbitrary preferences
among persons. ''24  Consider Grisez's most developed formulation: "One
goods."; (2) "[d]o not act out of hostility to the detriment of any basic human good."; (3) "[d]o not be an
individualist in acting for the sake of the good in response to feelings of enthusiasm or impatience.";
(4) "Do not let feelings of inertia keep you from acting for the good."; (5) "[d]o not act on the basis of
feelings of aversion except to avoid some real evil other than the tension of enduring those feelings."; (6)
"[d]o not seek to satisfy emotional desires for their own sake but only as part of the pursuit or attainment
of some intelligible good"; (7) "[d]o not choose and act for the sake of the experience of participating in a
good in preference to the reality of doing so."; and (8) [dio not let the attraction exercised by one instance
of a basic human good lead you, in pursuing it, to act against another instance of a basic human good"). 1
GERMAIN G. GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 205-28 (1983)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (mentioning modes of responsibility). Grisez discusses other modes of
responsibility in PRINCIPLES: (1) "[o]ne should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible
goods"; (2) "[olne should not be pressed by enthusiasm for impatience to act individualistically for
intelligible goods"; (3) "[o]ne should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of one's
pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself'; (4) "[o]ne
should not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one's avoidance of some
intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion"; (5) "[olne should not,
in response to different feelings toward different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone
unless the preference is required by intelligible goods themselves"; (6) "[o]ne should not choose on the
basis of emotions which bear upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which
interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the bad"; (7) [o]ne should not be moved
by hostility to freely accept or choose the destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human
good"; and (8) "[o]ne should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible good to
act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other instance of an intelligible good"); LAW at
100-33 (detailing other modes of responsibility). Some of Finnis' modes of responsibility are: (1) "one
must have a harmonious set of purposes or orientations..."; (2) "there must be no leaving out of account,
or arbitrary discounting or exaggeration, of any of the basic human values"; (3) "we can add, to the second
requirement of fundamental impartiality of recognition of each of the basic forms of good, a third
requirement: of fundamental impartiality among the human subjects who are or may be partakers of those
goods"; (4) "one must have a certain detachment from all the specific and limited projects which one
undertakes"; (6) "having made one's general commitments one must not abandon them lightly... [and
one] should be looking creatively for new and better ways of carrying out one's commitments..."; (6)
"one [should] bring about good in the world (in one's own life and the lives of others) by actions that are
efficient for their (reasonable) purpose(s)"; (7) "one should not choose to do any act which of itself does
nothing but damage or impede a realization or participation of any one or more of the basic forms of
human good"; (8) "favour[] and foster[] the common good of one's communities"; and (9) "one should not
do what one judges or thinks or 'feels' all-in-all should not be done." ETHICS at 75 (describing other
modes of responsibility). Finnis also states these modes of responsibility: (1) "have a harmonious set of
orientations, purposes[,] and commitments; (2) "do not leave out of account, or arbitrarily discount or
exaggerate, any of the basic human goods; (3) "do not leave out of account, or arbitrarily discount or
exaggerate, the goodness of other people's participation in human goods"; (4) "do not attribute to any
particular project the overriding and unconditional significance which only a basic human good and a
general commitment can claim"; (5) "pursue one's general commitments with creativity and do not
abandon them lightly; (6) "do not waste your opportunities by using needlessly inefficient methods, and
do not overlook t he foreseeable bad consequences of your choices"; (7) "do not choose directly against
any basic human good"; (8) "foster the common good of your communities; (9) "do not act ... against
your best judgment about the implications for your own action of these requirements of practical
reasonableness and the moral principles they generate or justify").
24 LAW at 108.
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should not, in response to different feelings toward different persons,
willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the preference is
required by intelligible goods themselves., 25 Consider also Finnis': "do not
leave out of account, or arbitrarily discount or exaggerate, the goodness of
other people's participation in human good.
26
The Golden Rule does not preclude "reasonable self-preference."
For "it is through my self-determination and self-realizing participation in the
basic goods that I can do what reasonableness suggests and requires, viz.
favour and realize the forms of human good indicated in the first principles
of practical reason., 27 The goods of knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
religion, or friendship give one unlimited license to prefer some persons to
others. But respect for the basic human goods channels our preferences and
renders at least some of them non-arbitrary. So one "has no general
responsibility to give the well-being of other people as much care and
concern as one gives one's own; the good of others is as really good as one's
own good, but is not one's primary responsibility, and to give one's own
good priority is not, as such, to violate the requirement of impartiality.
'2 8
Thus, there may be "reasonable discrimination in favour of myself, my
family, my group(s) ... .,29 Respect for the basic human goods themselves
may require discrimination between persons-in the interests of friendship,
say, or play. Also, "an individual acts most appropriately for the common
good.., by performing ... contractual undertakings, and fulfilling... other
responsibilities, to ascertained individuals. Fulfilling one's particular
obligations ... is necessary if one is to respect and favour the common good
... simply because the common good is the good of individuals, living
together and depending upon one another in ways that favour the well-being
of each. 
30
[The Golden Rule] by no means excludes all forms and corresponding
feelings of preference for oneself and those who are near and dear (for
example, parental responsibility for, and consequent prioritizing of,
their own children). It excludes, rather, all those forms of preference
which are motivated only by desires, aversions, or hostilities that do not
correspond to intelligible aspects of the real reasons for action, the
25 PRINcIPLEs at 220.
26 ETHICS at 75.
27 LAw at 107.
2S Id. at 304.
29 Id. at 108.
30 Id. at 305.
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basic human goods instantiated in the lives of other human beings as in
the lives of oneself or those close to one's heart.
31
An imaginary, "impartially benevolent 'spectator' would condemn
some but not all forms of self-preference, and some but not all forms of
competition .... At the same time, however, the Golden Rule offers "a
pungent critique of selfishness, special pleading, double standards,
hypocrisy, indifference to the good of others whom one could easily help
... and all the other manifold forms of egoistic and group bias."
33
The Golden Rule is a subjective test. That is, its application requires
the agent to ask what she, personally, would and would not find acceptable:
"to apply the Golden Rule, one must know what burdens one considers too
great to accept. This knowledge, constituting a premoral commensuration,
cannot be a commensurating by reason. 34 One will simply need to rely on
one's preferences here. When one does, one will not be engaged in "a
rational and objective commensuration of goods and bads." However, "once
established," a subjective commensuration based on one's preferences
"enables one to measure one's options by a rational and objective standard of
interpersonal impartiality. 3 5 Not everyone might regard a certain cost as too
great to bear in particular circumstances. However, if I thus regard it, I
cannot rationally impose it on others in those circumstances.
Is it fair to impose on others the risks inherent in driving at more than
10 mph ... ? Yes, in our community, since our community has ...
decided to treat those risks and harms as not too great. Have we a
rational critique of a community which decided to limit road traffic to
10 mph and to accept all the economic and other costs of that decision?
... No, we have no rational critique of such a community .... [T]he
decision to permit road traffic to proceed faster than 10 mph ... was
rationally underdetermined.
But we do have a rational critique of someone who drives at 60
mph but who, when struck by someone driving 45 mph complains that
the speed is per se negligent .... And, in general, we have a rational
critique of those who accept the benefits of this and other communal
decisions but reject the correlative burdens as they bear on them and
those in whom they feel interested.36
31 John Finnis, Commensuration and Public Reason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACrICAL REASON 227 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) [hereinafter Commensuration].
32 LAw at 108.
33 Id. at 107.
34 Commensuration at 227.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 228.
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While making sense of their view of impartiality is most significant
for understanding the NCNLs' conception of the DRD, another principle of
practical reason is particularly relevant as well-one which (in Finnis'
formulation) enjoins both detachment and commitment. On the one hand, we
ought not to absolutize our projects, so that they may be pursued at the
expense of others' legitimate interests, or so that our sense of identity and
self-worth stands or falls with their success or failure. On the other hand,
however, we ought to be loath to abandon our commitments, not only to
others but also to ourselves. To treat one's commitments lightly "would
mean, in the extreme case, that one would fail ever to really participate in
any of the basic values.
3 7
B. The New Classical Natural Law Theory and Property Rights
Property rights, for the NCNLs, are social conventions. They root
their justification of these rights in two kinds of considerations. First, private
property rights safeguard individual autonomy.38 Second, such rights foster
the efficient and creative use of "natural resources, and the capital resources
and consumer durables derivable therefrom. 3 9  People's ownership of
property ensures that someone in particular will be responsible for the
management of particular things, and "the prospect of having something of
their own motivates people to work, to invent, and thus to create wealth."4
The rights created by a fair property system serve the appropriate purpose of
giving "the private owner freedom to expend his own creativity,
inventiveness, and undeflected care and attention upon the goods in question,
to give him security in enjoying them or investing or developing them, and to
afford him the opportunity of exchanging them for some alternative item(s)
of property seeming to him more suitable to his life-plan."' 4' Thus, the just
function of a private property system "is to give the owner first use and
enjoyment of it and its fruits (including rents and profits), for it is this
37 LAW at 110.
38 Cf. 2 GERMAIN G. GRIsEz, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 794-95
(1993) [hereinafter LIVING] (discussing the Vatican Il's teachings on private property, including the
necessity of some control over material things to achieve appropriate autonomy).
39 LAW at 170.
40 LIVING at 794.
41 LAW at 172.
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availability that enhances his reasonable autonomy and stimulates his
productivity and care. 
42
While some system of private property will be morally required in
many, perhaps most, circumstances, this is not because any particular
property rights are pre-political and certainly not because any such rights are
absolute. Rather, a system of property rights is justified to the extent that it
serves the common good and may be limited to the extent that it does not.
Distributive justice is a characteristic of actions rather than of states
of affairs; individual actors, and not only the state, must respect norms of
distributive justice. This does not mean that they are expected unilaterally to
bring about just end-states. However, that they must acknowledge the just
claims of others and just limits on their own rights. Thus, they will have
good reason to support a system of private property rights, within limits, to
accept it as legitimate, to take as their own the underlying reasons which
make such a system reasonable, and to accept as appropriate the rights it
confers on themselves as well as on others. At the same time, they will
recognize that the system cannot necessarily be fine-tuned enough to address
all questions of distributive justice. Thus, they must acknowledge that they
will not, therefore, be able to conform their conduct to the norms of
distributive justice simply by following the rules of the private property
system that obtains in their society, even if those rules are themselves just.
Thus, Grisez rejects "the individualistic notion that, having earned
money or come by it in some other legitimate way, people may keep it for
themselves or do with it as they please," opting instead for the "more
reasonable view that ... possessing wealth entails the responsibility to see
that it is used fairly to meet human needs .... "44 Similarly, Finnis maintains
that "[tihe private owner of a natural resource of capital good has a duty in
justice to put it to productive use or, if he lacks the further resources required
to do so, to dispose of it to someone willing and able to do so."'45 He notes,
too, that justice further precludes unproductive speculation, the hoarding of
capital assets, the failure to maintain valuable assets, and the creation of
monopolies and oligolopolies, among other practices that preclude the
fulfillment of the legitimate purposes of a private property regime. 46
42 Id. at 173.
43 Cf. Gary Chartier, Urban Redevelopment and Land Reform: Theorizing Eminent Domain after
Kelo, 11 LEGAL THEORY 363 (2005) (outlining an overall account of property rights indebted to, but
differing significantly from, that advanced by Finnis).
44 3 GERMAIN G. GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS 504
(1997) [hereinafter QUESTIONS].
45 LAw at 172.
46 Id. at 172-73.
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As a result, Finnis judges that "beyond a reasonable measure and
degree of such use for his and his dependants' or co-owners' needs, .... [a
property owner] holds the remainder of his property and its fruits as part...
of the common stock. ' '47 Thus, "[flrom this point, the owner has, in justice,
duties not altogether unlike those of a trustee in English law." The owner
may fulfill these duties "by investing his surplus in production of more goods
for later distribution and consumption; by providing gainful employment to
people looking for work; by grants or loans for hospitals, schools, cultural
centres, orphanages, etc., or directly for the relief of the poor." In cases in
which owners cannot or will not do this, the state "may rightly help them to
perform them by devising and implementing schemes of distribution. ,48 It is
clear though, by implication, that the failure of the authorities to act does not
absolve individuals of responsibility for acting in distributively just ways
when they are able to do so.
C. Distributive Justice and the Golden Rule
For the NCNLs, distributive justice is a characteristic of just actions,
not of states of affairs. There is no algorithm that will determine definitively
what actions will count as distributively just in a given situation. Several
factors are relevant though, including need,49 function, ° capacity,51 deserts
and contributions (or merit),52 and the creation or anticipation and
acceptance of avoidable risks.53
We may reasonably see these criteria as reflecting the requirement of
fairness embodied in the Golden Rule, sometimes in tandem with one or
more of the basic goods. Thus, need, function, capacity, and risk acceptance
can all reasonably be defended as norms of distribution in light of the Golden
Rule. The use of deserts and contributions can be defended in this way as
well, though the good of friendship, among others, will be relevant here as
well. Thus, Grisez notes that "merit, need, and ability to contribute" are
criteria which are "all ... reducible to the Golden Rule., 54  Promises,
47 id. at 173.
48 Id.
49 Need here appears to mean something rather narrower than genuine need, as that is used
elsewhere by the NCNLs. Id. at 174.
50 That is, filling a particular societal or institutional role (firefighter, say, or surgeon). Id. at 175.
51 That is, the ability to use something. Finnis' example is that flutes should go to floutists, not,
say, trombonists. Id.
52 That is, the extent or value to others of one's efforts. Id.
53 Id. at 174-75.
5 LIVING at 328.
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contracts, and relationships of dependence will also acquire some of their
moral force from the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule will provide additional
support for a range of distributional criteria to the extent that they will play a
valuable role at the systemic level in ensuring the efficient production and
distribution of goods and services.
It is also relevant to the moral status of commitments: the making of
commitments must itself be governed by the Golden Rule; otherwise, one
could simply eliminate many or most of the obligations of distributive justice
one might otherwise need to fulfill simply by making commitments of
various sorts. Once made, however, a reasonable commitment clearly does
affect one's distributional responsibilities. Keeping commitments to oneself
and to others is a matter of respect for the good of self-integration, and
keeping commitments to others is a requirement of fairness, and so of the
Golden Rule, as well as of respect for the norm requiring not only
detachment but commitment.
In light of a reasonable personal (e.g., vocational, relational,
educational) commitment I have made, it may be perfectly reasonable
for me to treat, and, indeed, it may be patently unreasonable for me to
fail to treat, certain basic values or certain possible instantiations of a
single basic value as superior to others in their directive force (for me).
Choosing in harmony with one's past reasonable commitments, and,
thus, establishing or maintaining one's personal integrity... constitutes
an important moral reason which often guides our choices between
rationally grounded options.55
Actions fulfilling reasonable commitments responsive to the basic
goods can be distributively just even though they do not treat all possible
beneficiaries of one's actions equally.
D. The New Classical Natural Law Theory and the Singer- Unger Thesis
Finnis rejects what he takes to be a mischievous development in
much recent moralizing, the notion that "everyone of us is responsible for
everyone else in every way.",56  This notion, he observes, leads to the
conclusion that, because "each person counts for one and only one,"
everyone must be "morally bound to devote his wealth and energy (which he
might otherwise have devoted to the interests of himself, his 'dependants,'
his own local and political communities, etc.) to the interests of the most
55 ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw 94 (1999) [hereinafter DEFENSE].
56 LAw at 176.
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disadvantaged persons whom he can find anywhere in the world, up to the
point where his (marginal) sacrifice of wealth and energy would render
himself and his 'dependants' worse off than those most disadvantaged
persons. Any other use of one's wealth and energy is, on this view, simply
unjust."57
He challenges this notion on two grounds. To the extent that it
depends on consequentialist foundations, it should be rejected because
consequentialism is itself incoherent and insupportable. The
incommensurability of basic goods (both the goods as categories and
individual instances of these goods), and the resultant non-viability of
consequentialist moral reasoning, rules out any attempt to ground a Singer-
Unger version of a DRD in a requirement that we optimize or maximize the
good.
He also maintains that the principle that "each person counts for one
and only one" "is not reasonable as a principle for the practical deliberations
of anyone. 5 8 The specific duties of distributive justice which anyone has
"depends essentially on what responsibilities he has, whether by virtue of his
own voluntary commitments... or by virtue of his past or present receipt of
benefits from another. . . , or by virtue of the dependence of others upon him
.... or by virtue of a network of relationships of actual and potential
interdependencies ... .,59 Thus, in fact, he maintains, "[o]f everyone it is
true that, because of his promises, and/or his parenthood, and/or his debts of
gratitude, and/or his relations of interdependence with or assumption of
authority in relation to ascertained persons or communities, he cannot
reasonably give equal 'weight,' or equal concern, to the interests of every
person anywhere whose interests he could ascertain and affect." 6 Similarly,
George underscores the NCNLT's support for the common-sense conviction
that one ordinarily has no moral duty to forgo one's ordinary pursuits,
including playing golf, to devote oneself to life saving or to joining
famine relief projects and other worthy lifesaving endeavors in far off
places. Although he may very well have a moral duty to contribute
money or goods in kind to the effort, and, perhaps, to pray for its
success, a professional golfer who lives in Scotland does not violate the
57 Id. at 177.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 175.
60 Id. at 177.
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Golden Rule (or any moral norm) when he declines to abandon his
61career in order to, say, join the relief effort in Bangladesh.
It is not the case that subsistence needs always have a first claim on
one's resources: "For example, meeting in moderate ways the religious,
moral, and cultural needs of one's own children takes priority over feeding
someone else's, even if the latter are starving; parents are not free to be
merciful at their children's expense. ''62 Indeed, satisfying various types of
needs "contributes in incommensurable ways to the well-being and
fulfillment of persons," making the choice to meet any genuine need "the
willing of at least some person's good.., and the meeting of any one sort of
genuine need is not in and of itself better and more loving than the meeting
of another."63  "We must make choices, opting for certain areas of
concentration in preference to others, and doing so precisely as our particular
contribution to the common life of commitment to human goods which we
share with those with whom we live in community. ' 64
Thus, "cultural centres" are appropriate recipients of one's surplus
just as are the poor and charities serving them. Similarly,
[e]ven if the money you could donate to ... [a development NGO]
would save the lives of people who otherwise would die, you will not
... [support a college] at the cost of those lives by giving the money to
the college instead. You neither will have willed those people to die-
for example, by choosing to kill them as a means to some other end-
nor judged their lives of less worth than the benefits of... [the gift to
the college]. You only will have reluctantly accepted their deaths as a
side effect of promoting the other good. And, provided you can choose
that other good fairly, you need not be unreasonable in choosing-not
as better, but simply as the irreplaceable good it is.65
61 DEFENSE at 98. If one need not devote one's time exclusively to relief efforts, it does not seem
plausible that one would need to devote one's resources to such efforts, either. George goes on: "Of
course, the absence of a moral duty to abandon golf to go to Bangladesh does not entail the presence of a
moral duty not to give up the good of playing golf in order to help save famine victims in Bangladesh. It
may turn out that a choice either way is not only rationally grounded (and, therefore, not strictly arbitrary)
but morally permissible (i.e., not excluded by any moral norm.)" Id. George observes that "[d]epending
on the circumstances-in particular, on any special duties he might have as a father, husband, colleague,
valuable participant in worthy local causes, etc.-we might commend (and even recommend) his going to
Bangladesh as a supererogatory act." Id. at 101 n.22.
62 QUESTIONS at 438.
63 Id.
64 MORALrIY at 236.
65 QUESTIONS at 438 (italics supplied).
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Special ties to the college, the fact that a gift might memorialize a dead
spouse, the fact that one's children may attend the college, and the fact that
one might obtain a seat on the college's board of trustees as a result of the
gift all might give one good reason to give to the college rather than the
NGO,66 and so could render one's choice to do so fair-consistent with the
Golden Rule. While it will not, because it cannot, be determined by an
incoherent injunction to maximize net good in the world, a DRD consistent
with the NCNLT will be shaped and constrained by the norms of distributive
justice.67
E. Conclusion
The NCNLT focuses on reasonable participation in basic human
goods-participation normed by modes of responsibility including the
Golden Rule. The Golden Rule mandates fairness, but not a self-alienating
impartiality. It grounds personal property rights, but at the same time
justifies significant limits on those rights. Implicit in the Rule are norms of
distributive justice, including need, function, capacity, merit, and risk
acceptance. The Golden Rule and these criteria, together with the NCNLTs'
understanding of basic goods and their resultant rejection of
consequentialism provide the basis for the NCNLs' rejection of the Singer-
Unger thesis. For the NCNLTs, this thesis is mistaken because it implies a
consequentialist duty to maximize the good and because it ignores the
specific distributional responsibilities and options rooted in a satisfactory
account of distributive justice. In Part IIl, I provide an account of a DRD
elaborated in the context of an analysis of the new classical natural theory's
understanding of distributive justice.
66 Id. at 439.
67 On these norms, see LAW at 174-75 (stating that there are no "precise yardsticks" for assessing
distribution). Although there are no "precise yardsticks," Finnis states that several criteria are important
factors in weighing the question of just distribution: The primary criterion involves determining who in
society needs the distribution for basic human needs; the second criterion involves function, and
determining what "need[s] [are] relative not directly to basic human good but to roles and responsibilities
in the community"; the third criterion is capacity, relative to both roles in communal enterprises and to
opportunities for individual advancement; the fourth criterion is "deserts and contributions"; the fifth
criterion is whether some parties have created or foreseen and accepted avoidable risks versus those who
have neither created the risks "nor had the opportunity of foreseeing or of avoiding or insuring against
them"; and the final criterion is determining what practical reasonableness requires of particular people in
their dealings with other people, which can vary largely depend on several other factors.
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III. Beneficence in the New Classical Natural Law Theory
The NCNLs argue that we have a substantial duty of beneficence.
We have no consequentialist duty to maximize the good (the injunction to do
so is, recall, nonsense). However, we hold in trust, for the common good,
the portion of our wealth which is not required to meet our needs. There is
no obligation to target all of one's contributions to the worst-off. One does
wrong, however, if one hordes wealth rather than using it in some way for
the common good.
If the NCNLs' understanding of beneficence does provide a
reasonably determinate account of an individual DRD, then it will, by
implication, offer a reasonable basis for a morally defensible use of public
resources to support aid to less developed countries. In Part I, I explore this
understanding. The NCNLs' account of distributive justice explains why
their theory does not require acceptance of the Singer-Unger thesis.
Questions remain about just what their theory does require though.6 8 I begin
by noting specific casuistic judgments they seem inclined to make about
individual consumption decisions. I go on to seek a plausible rationale for
these judgments in light of their various observations about justice in
distribution. I suggest that their approach is promising, but that it is not
altogether clear how to operationalize their criteria in the needed way.
A. Contours of the New Classical Natural Lawyers' Conception of Need
For the NCNLs, need determines how much we may consume. It
sets the maximum beyond which any expenditures of our resources must be
justified by their contribution to the public good. "[B]eyond a reasonable
measure and degree of ... use for his dependants' or co-owners' needs, ...
[a property owner] holds the remainder of his property and its fruits as part
(in justice if not in law) of the common stock. '69 What we do not need,
therefore, we hold as a public trust.
Some examples drawn from the NCNLs' own comments on these
matters offer a clearer sense of the contours of their conception of need.
A vacation in the mountains or at the seashore would be
appropriate, even if one at "a posh resort in the South
68 Finnis observes that "the problem of assessing the extent of one's responsibilities for the
welfare of persons in other political communities ... is one of the most difficult of all practical problems;
and its resolution, by each of us, is constantly threatened by the pull of unreasonable self-preference,
group bias, and lukewarmness about human good." Id. at 177.
69 Id. at 173.
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Pacific" that cost ten times as much as one of these would
not be.70 A skiing vacation is evidently, at least in principle,
unproblematic.7 1
* An overly costly wedding will be an affront to social
justice.72 But a marriage celebration is worth spending
money on, even if a "family's wedding celebrations ...
[need] not meet the material standards set by families
financially better off than ... [its own] or whose sense of
values may be distorted. 7 3  A celebration can be valuable
insofar as it honors parents and children, helps to bond
family members, and serves, perhaps, to cement a marriage.
Expenditure levels should be guided by consideration of
these needs.
* Art should be privately funded;74 and there is nothing in
Grisez's comments on this topic to suggest that it should be
privately purchased only for display in museums. Even if he
does think this about high art, though he does not say so, he
evidently regards the development of the modem novel as a
worthwhile occurrence; 75 the novel can be a viable art form
only if privately purchased, and novels are likely to be
written only if novelists do something with their time other
than working to make money they can give to others.
* Being a professional golfer seems to be a perfectly
appropriate activity,76 even though one's function will
essentially be to provide entertainment to others.
70 See QUESTIONS at 808 (adding that: "Simplicity and self-denial indicate that one of the less
costly alternatives is to be preferred").
71 See DEFENSE at 94, 100 n. 14 (comparing ski vacation packages, and stating that a ski vacation
package that does not exceed the basic minimal cost of such package is acceptable).
72 See LIVING at 750-5 1(discussing how weddings can sometimes exemplify consumerism rather
than serving the essential goods of marriage).
73 See QUESTIONS at 176 (providing a helpful citation to a 1996 bookby Denise and Alan Fields
called Bridal Bargains: Secrets to Throwing a Fantastic Wedding on a Realistic Budget, which offers
suggestions for reducing wedding costs).
74 Cf. QUESTIONS at 839-44 (examining the question of whether morality should limit public
funding of the arts, and discussing the NEA grants, in particular").
75 See MORALrrY at 196 ("[Ihe greatest steps forward in the arts occur on those rare occasions
when a whole new art form-for example, the modem novel-is elaborated and becomes available .... ).
76 See DEFENSE at 95 (comparing and contrasting the dilemma of choosing from one of two
options, both of which have intrinsic value. The first option is saving a child from drowning, referred to
as the 'life' value, and the second option is to forego the rescue and continue one's golf game, also called
the 'play' value. "In choosing between options in which competing basic values are involved, identify,
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* Buying a turkey for Thanksgiving dinner is acceptable, but
doing so with the expectation that one will ask for one's
money back under a strict interpretation of a store's
guarantee might be, thought not unfair, avaricious.
77
* Computers can evidently be reasonably purchased. 8
* Cosmetics can serve a useful purpose and using them
doesn't seem to be in principle objectionable.79
* Regularly patronizing a high-end restaurant that features fine
wines is immoral.80 But it is evidently not the case that there
are no occasions when patronizing such a restaurant would
be wrong.81
* Even if establishments devoted to the consumption of fine
wine may be morally troubling, there is nothing wrong with
82the production or consumption of wine, per se.
Gambling can be "chosen for a good reason and engaged in
virtuously .... ,,83
and choose the option which preserves or advances the weightier value." This implies that, at least in
some circumstances, choosing golfing is acceptable).
77 See QUESTIONS at 588 ("Even if taking advantage of the guarantee did not cheat the merchant,
supposing you acted out of avarice what you did was incompatible with your responsibility as a
participant in the business-along with its owners, employees, and so on-to cooperate for its common
good.").
78 See LrVING at 822 (addressing the materialist concerns over the purchase of computer
equipment). Computer equipment is often purchased for the materialistic reasons, not because it can
fulfill a positive function. Further, many people buy computer equipment that they do not know, nor do
they learn, how to use. These concerns may be overcome by making informed purchases and by learning
to use the equipment so that the purchase does not go to waste.
79 See QUESTIONS at 265 ("Though makeup sometimes is a sign of vanity, its judicious use
servies legitimate purposes other than trying to hide the signs of aging.").
80 "Friends say [Robert P.] George is as comfortable in a three-star Paris restaurant as he is
fishing in the Canadian wilderness...." Anne Morse, Conservative Heavyweight: The Remarkable Mind
of Robert P. George, CRISIS, Sept. 2003, at 36-42, available at http://www.catholiceducation.org
/articles/catholic-stories/cs0051.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Perhaps George and Grisez simply
disagree about the ethics of dining. Perhaps George frequents such establishments no more frequently
than Grisez's analysis suggests is appropriate.
81 See QUESTIONS at 490-95. (addressing the question of whether attractive people may be
preferred for certain jobs and in doing so, stating "You describe your restaurant as an expensive one
patronized by the affluent who, very likely, spend a good deal there on luxurious foods and fine wines. In
operating your business, you must promote and thereby intend that sort of consumption. Can you
honestly judge that all of it, or at least enough of it to make your business profitable, is morally
justifiable? If not, you intend what is unjustifiable, and you need to repent and change the character of
your business ... ). Notice that Grisez, while he may come close to doing so, does not say the high-end
restaurant should be shut down. If operating a restaurant entails promoting it, and promoting it is
legitimate only if patronizing it is, then clearly patronizing restaurants in general is not morally troubling,
even if high-end restaurants are morally problematic.
82 Cf. QUESTIONS at 603 ("People who need not and do not intend the abuse of alcohol, however,
may continue to promote and profit from its use, provided they do what they reasonably can to prevent
and discourage abuse.").
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It is "a mistaken assumption that all recreational activity is a
luxury. '' 84  And "everyone needs some recreation, and
activities that really serve that purpose also serve other
interests, such as gaining knowledge, having experiences
valuable for their own sake, and exercising various skills."
Further, money "spent traveling in less prosperous places
also... [contributes to] the local economy and so, in a small
way, help[s] to alleviate poverty, especially if one patronizes
locally owned and operated businesses. 85
* "[M]otion pictures and television" are "delightful in various
ways,''86 and there is nothing to suggest that people should
not consume movies and watch television programs-
something that obviously costs money-provided they
employ critical judgment (which will vary with the age of
the viewer).87
* Non-human animals purportedly have no rights, and thus are
clearly not on a par with humans, 88 but it nonetheless may be
appropriate for veterinarians to provide them with services.89
83 LIVING at 818-20; QUESTIONS at 839 (noting the possibility that some "people of modest
means" might be able "rightly [to] gamble in casinos," while observing that "[t]he state justly refuses to
facilitate, and even inhibit, many good things when that serves the common good," and thus implying that
casino gambling could be a good thing for some of the people to whom he refers); but cf. QUESTIONS at
837-39 (arguing that legislators should not support the legalization of casino gambling when stating
"[m]y contribution to the case against legalizing and licensing casino gambling is to argue that any
legislator who supports it to gain tax revenue and/or attract tourists intends-and so is morally responsible
for-immoral gambling.").
84 QUESTIONS at 427.
85 QUESTIONS at 427.
86 LIVING at 709.
87 See LIVING at 709 (stressing the active, not passive, role parents should play in regulating their
child's exposure to motion pictures and television).
88 See LIVING at 771-82 (explaining the misguided philosophical norm suggesting that animals
have co-equal rights to human beings). Cf. STEPHEN R. L. CLARK, THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS
(1977) (explaining that "[a] burning cat is as agonized as any burning baby. Even where we do have
reason to impute a lesser pain, yet pain is painful"). Also valuable are PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (2d ed. 2002); TOM REGAN, THE CASE
FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); MARK ROWLANDS, ANIMALS LIKE US (2003); DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI,
HARTSHORNE AND THE METAPHYSICS OF ANIMAL RIGHTS (1988); JOHN L. HILL, THE CASE FOR
VEGETARIANISM: PHILOSOPHY FOR A SMALL PLANET (1996); STEVE F. SAPONTZIS, MORALS, REASONS,
AND ANIMALS (1987); STEPHEN R. L. CLARK, ANIMALS AND THEIR MORAL STANDING (1998).
89 See QUESTIONS at 120-22 (providing further insight via a discussion of whether one should
intervene when parents mistreatment their children).
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Purchasing "toys and games which will promote activities
that benefit children"90 is evidently an appropriate use of
resources.
Scholarly work in philosophy is a perfectly acceptable use
for one's gifts,91 even if this fails to meet anyone's
subsistence needs.92
Selling jewelry is evidently a morally appropriate activity,
which must mean that promoting the sale of jewelry is
appropriate-which must mean, in turn, that the purchase of
jewelry is morally appropriate.
93
Sports teams deserve some support-at least for their
community-building function 94-which will obviously
mean, in practical terms, providing them with financial
support.
* Taking a pleasure cruise is an unjustified, and thus immoral,
activity for which one should make restitution.
95
* Though a face-lift would not be morally acceptable simply
to conceal the effects of aging, and would be especially
troubling because of its great cost, it might be justifiable if it
helped to facilitate a marriage or aided a person in securing a
96
job.
* Travel and photography are, in principle, perfectly
acceptable recreations on which to spend money.97
9 LIVING at 708.
91 See QUESTIONS at 29-33 (discussing whether a man should set out to be both a scholar and a
priest).
92 Who is to support the life of the scholar? Perhaps the scholar herself could pursue a life of
scholarship while only her subsistence needs were being met. However, in a group in which everyone
was occupied only in meeting basic needs, no one would be in a position to provide financial support for
scholarly activity.
93 See QUESTIONS at 623-26 (examining a broader question of whether someone, when buying
used goods, may take advantage of the sellers' ignorance).
94 Watching a sporting event involves the good of aesthetic experience as well as the good of
friendship---and perhaps also the good of play, a fact Finnis and Grisez would not dispute.
95 See QUESTIONS at 447-53 (evaluating the moral norms one should follow in tipping, and
stating "[tiherefore, without presuming to criticize your Caribbean cruise, I suggest you examine your
conscience about it.").
96 See QUESTIONS at 265 (providing that even in this case, the face-lift would be morally
acceptable only if necessary, and explaining that, since it would involve "surrendering to cultural
pressures and reinforcing the biases that underlie them," the face-lift would never be merely optional). Cf.
LIVING at 541-43 (discussing the balance of bodily integrity and health).
97 See QUESTIONS at 427 (explaining inter alia that "For example, you might visit places in this
country and abroad where you could gain firsthand experience of human misery, capture its images on
film, and thus gather material to enclose in your letters or illustrate talks and/or articles intended to raise
others' social consciousness.").
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* While booking some night-club acts may be morally wrong,
there's nothing wrong, in principle, with operating a night-
club.98  Entertainment serves legitimate purposes-
presumably needs, given the nonjudgmental way Grisez
discusses this topic-for its consumers: it "help[s] them to
relax, to celebrate, to communicate with one another, and so
strengthen[s] them and their relationships, and should send
them back to their other responsibilities ... more ready
to fulfill them." 99
B. A Genuine Need as an Intelligible Good in Which One Reasonably
Participates
According to Grisez, genuine needs are ones which are "marked out
by the basic human goods .... So genuine need refers not only to the basic
necessities but to the less obvious yet real needs for religious, moral, and
cultural goods." °° Thus, "genuine need refers to more than the conditions
for bare survival and professional expenses; it embraces everything to be
used in living a morally good life, and so includes such things as a good
education for ... children, decent recreation, and appropriate gifts to
relatives and friends . . . ."101 "What genuine excludes are mere objects of
emotional desire and anything that would be obtained, used, or enjoyed
sinfully."'12 This suggests, then, that any authentic, intelligible good in
which one participates reasonably will count as, in some broad sense, a
need. 10 3  I suggest that reasonableness will be a function of (1) the
98 See QUESTIONS at 612 ("As the owner of the place, you have every right, not only morally but
legally, to decide what you will and will not book; you are responsible for the tone of your place and have
the right to be selective.").
99 Id.
100 Id. at 436. Cf. LIVING at 801 (defining "genuine need" to include something more than that
which is necessary for survival).
101 Id. at 808.
102 Id. at 436. Cf. LIVING at 801 (defining "genuine" to exclude goods that are procured or used
sinfully).
103 JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY, 191-93 (1998) [hereinafter
AQUINAS]. Explicating the views of Aquinas, Finnis suggests a twofold categorization of need: basic
needs common to all persons, and needs specific to one's social role or function. As long as role or
function is understood broadly, to include not only one's occupation but also one's informal roles-as
friend, say-this approach seems to make better sense of Finnis' position. The threshold past which one
would be required to redistribute one's wealth, then, would be the threshold past which not only basic but
also functionally related needs had been met. It remains difficult, though, to square this with everything
Finnis says. Obviously, there is no meaningful sense in which it is strictly necessary to attend a salon
concert by select musicians, which Finnis seems to think could be a reasonable target of expenditure (see
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authenticity of the good in question (because an authentic good is inherently
valuable, one has reason to pursue such a good that extends beyond "mere
emotional desire"); (2) the consistency of one's pursuit of the good with the
Golden Rule and other moral norms; and (3) one's commitments and
vocation (consistency with the relevant norms, along with fidelity to one's
commitments and vocation, would ordinarily be sufficient to ensure that one
would not obtain, use, or enjoy the relevant good wrongly).
1. The Authenticity of the Good in Question
A good in which one seeks to participate must be authentic-one of
the basic human goods. By contrast, an act designed to foster participation in
an illusory good would not qualify as one in pursuit of a genuine need.
It is, of course, open to question what will count as an illusory good.
While the NCNLs judge life and bodily well-being, speculative knowledge,
practical reasonableness, self-integration, play, friendship, religion, and
aesthetic experience to be authentic goods, they regard sensory pleasure and
entertainment as lacking inherent value. This seems to me to be unduly
restrictive.
The NCNLs are surely right that it would be irrational to understand
friendship, say, as a device for producing a discriminable pleasurable
sensation.' °4 To the extent that there are pleasurable sensations associated
with friendship, aesthetic experience, or any of the other basic goods the
NCNLs identify, these sensations will be epiphenomenal-consequences of
one's apprehension of real or apparent goods, not explanations or sources of
these goods' value. To say that the basic goods are basic is to say that their
value is not a function of something else, including pleasure. It does not
follow that pleasurable sensations are not themselves good, however. Just
because it is a mistake to treat friendship as if it were a means to pleasurable
sensations-rather than realizing that, when we speak of the "pleasure of
friendship" or of "taking pleasure in friendship," we're using talk of pleasure
to signal our recognition of friendship's inherent worth-we need not
conclude that pleasure lacks independent value. Physical pleasure seems to
below, Part III, Sec. C). If it is not necessary that anyone do so though, then will wealth spent to make
such concerts, and attendance at them, possible be mis-spent on Finnis' view? Obviously, no single
instance of aesthetic experience will be necessary. The question, however, is whether a whole class of
experiences is necessary? Could not the select musicians simply perform in large public settings, or make
their work available on recordings? Perhaps Finnis' own view represents an advance here over Aquinas.'
104 Cf. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ABOUT LOVE: REINVENTING ROMANCE FOR OUR TIME (1988)
(noting, on Aristotelian grounds similar to those defended by the NCNLs, that love is not a means of
producing such pleasurable sensations as those often accompanying it, but that these feelings are, instead,
characteristic accompaniments of love).
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me (though I will not argue the case against the NCNLs here) to be an
inherently valuable good, basic in much the same way aesthetic experience,
speculative knowledge, or self-integration might be inherently valuable.
This means that the pleasure of good food, sexual pleasure, the pleasure of
smooth sheets or a deep massage, are all inherently valuable and can
reasonably be sought for their own sake, not merely as means to some other
end or by-products of the pursuit of some other goal.
The same is true of entertainment. Entertainment is an inherently
subjective good in much the way that aesthetic experience is. That is to say,
both, like pleasure, involve ineliminable reference to someone's consciously
participating in them. I can participate in the good of life and bodily well-
being without knowing it-when I am asleep, say, or comatose. I cannot
have an aesthetic experience without being aware that I am doing so
though-I wouldn't be having an experience at all. Entertainment is
subjective in a comparable way.
Much of what we think of as entertainment will involve other goods.
There will certainly be aesthetic qualities to an athletic performance; perhaps
the spectators might be said in some sense to be participating in the good of
play by supporting and cheering for their favored teams; watching sporting
events is often a bonding experience for friends. However, it seems
ultimately as if these analyses fail to capture what is phenomenologically the
case regarding experiences of entertainment. If I watch a film, not to learn
about a foreign culture, not to appreciate the director's art, not to provide an
occasion for relaxed engagement with my partner, but simply to enjoy laugh-
out-loud jokes or to relish the triumph of good over evil, or to enter an
imaginatively conceived world, what I seek is not reducible to anything else
but entertainment. There are different sorts of entertainment, and the
entertaining is often mixed with other goods. It seems though, as if I am
seeking something specifiable independently of these goods, that it is a
coherent possibility to pursue entertainment for its own sake, and so to
understand it as an inherent good.
For the NCNLs, physical pleasure is not a good-it is, at best,
supervenient or epiphenomenal on other goods-and seeking it as an end in
itself is self-mutilating. The same is likely true of entertainment (understood
as I have viewed it here), since in both cases, for the NCNLs, one would be
seeking subjective experience directly, in a way that turned the body into an
instrument for the benefit of the conscious self. I will not attempt here to
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explain why I find these counter-intuitive claims unpersuasive10 5  I note
only, and obviously, that they are counter-intuitive-most people do, I think,
regard physical pleasure and entertainment as worth pursuing for their own
sake-and that rejecting them could meaningfully expand the range of goods
someone might directly pursue with good reason, and thus the range of needs
recognized by the NCNLs. Of course, recognizing this would not mean
accepting all instances of the pursuit of physical pleasure or entertainment as
appropriate-other moral norms, particularly those concerned with fairness
and efficiency, would be crucially relevant.
In any case, a reconstructive critique of the NCNLs' specific
conclusions regarding consumption would not stand or fall with judgments
about the inherent worth of physical pleasure and entertainment: most
consumption decisions do not need to be explained or justified with reference
to pleasure or entertainment, not least because many of the consumption
decisions people might make in pursuit of pleasure or entertainment are also
made, at the same time, in view of other goods the NCNLs do regard as
intelligible. Even if some consumption choices would be justifiable only if
pleasure or entertainment were intelligible goods, enough other such choices
are obviously explicable with reference to what the NCNLs themselves
would regard as genuine needs.
2. Consistency with the Golden Rule and Other Moral Norms
The only expenditures ruled out in principle by the NCNLT will be
those that involve attempted participation in illusory goods or the inefficient
pursuit of real goods, or that are intentionally made in the interests of
injustice. The fact that one is pursuing an authentic good does not entitle one
to ignore other moral norms. 10 6 A pair of earrings may be a very suitable
birthday gift for one's wife, but one has no right for this reason to steal it. 107
It may be morally appropriate to purchase a glass of wine, but not if one is an
105 For a first pass at a discussion of the NCNLs' position with a focus specifically on sexual
pleasure, see Gary Chartier, Comment, Natural Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Virtue, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1593, 1605-09 (2001).
106 Grisez observes that goods acquired, used, or enjoyed sinfully are not needed. See QUESTIONS
at 436 ("So, genuine needs refers not only to the basic necessities but ot the less obvious yet real needs for
religious, moral, and cultural goods. What genuine excludes are mere objects of emotional desire and
anything that would be obtained, used, or enjoyed sinfully."). Cf. LIVING at 801 (describing how
obtaining goods sinfully negates the genuine need).
107 Grisez treats the moral acceptability of one's pursuit or enjoyment of the relevant good as an
aspect of its genuineness. For the sake of analytical precision, I have distinguished this characteristic of
reasonableness from the feature of genuineness.
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alcoholic and taking another drink will restart one's pattern of addiction.
One must consider the other modes of responsibility.
In particular, one should assess the aptness of an expenditure by
asking about its fairness in accordance with the Golden Rule. This need not
mean evaluating each individual expenditure. Rather, the NCNLs seem
plausibly to suppose, the Golden Rule may be applied to a package of
consumption decisions, taken as a whole. Thus, one may fairly trade off
some expenditures against others.10 8
All of the principles of practical reason endorsed by the NCNLs may
be relevant at various points to decisions about consumption, and it is surely
appropriate to ask about the consistency of an action or policy with the
Golden Rule as such. However, several-further specifying the Golden
Rule's mandate of fairness-are particularly relevant. The Golden Rule
requires that one help others when one can easily do so, and it embodies
norms of distributive justice that bind individual actors. It requires that we
participate in authentic goods efficiently. It might also be thought to justify
conferring benefits on oneself when doing so also benefits others, and to
permit one to incentivize oneself to earn income that can be used, in part, to
benefit others by spending some of what one makes on oneself.
a. A General Duty of Aid
Finnis dismisses as unreasonable, and so immoral, "indifference to
the good of others whom one could easily help."109 George is clear that a
golfer confronted with a drowning child "has a moral obligation to interrupt
his game to save the child."" 0  The Golden Rule as interpreted-
reasonably-by the NCNLs clearly includes a duty to assist others. This
duty is not, to be sure, unlimited: none of us wishes to be simply a
component of the universal satisfaction system. None of us wishes to be
devoured by the needs of others. Thus we would tend not to regard as
arbitrary a specification of the Golden Rule that precluded nepotism and
special pleading, and required moderate beneficence, but did not require us
to devote the bulk of our time and energy to improving the general good.
This is a point recognized by other moral theories that employ versions of the
108 See QUESTIONS at 425-28 (discussing whether a retiree may accept a job to get extra money
for optional expenditures, and stating that "[iln judging how much one may spend on recreational
activities, on emust consider others' needs as well as one's own, and apply the Golden Rule.").
109 LAw at 107.
110 DEFENSE at 95.
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Golden Rule, or one of its cousins. They characteristically spell out the duty
of aid in a way that tends to agree, at least in this way, with the NCNLs'
evident understanding of this implication of the Golden Rule's non-
arbitrariness requirement."'1
b. Distributive Justice
The Golden Rule is the ground of the NCNLs' criteria of distributive
justice. It generates several specific criteria for just distribution: need,
function, capacity, deserts and contributions (or merit), and the creation or
anticipation and acceptance of avoidable risks.
I believe it makes the most sense to assume that, for the NCNLs, one
may reasonably employ all of these criteria to determine what resources one
holds in trust for the public good and what resources one may use for
oneself. It is hard to be certain, given that the NCNLs' list begins with need,
and the NCNLs maintain that one holds in trust what one does not need. It
might seem as if, with respect to oneself, these other criteria of distribution
are simply irrelevant, or only arise until the public trust threshold has been
reached. Thus, I might be required to distribute to others in a way that
showed respect for capacity, function, and so forth. However, any recipient
already enjoying "the fundamental component of the human good" would be
required to treat anything she received from me which was not required for
her to do so as held in trust for the public good, and so, often, to redistribute
it to others. Deserts and contributions, capacity, function, the acceptance of
risk-none would matter very much.
The dilemma may be resolved if we assume that, as it appears on this
list of criteria, need point to what is basic or essential in a narrower sense-
perhaps what is needed for subsistence. By contrast, we could hold, a
genuine need is any good in which one participates reasonably. The primary
test of reasonableness will be fairness. Fairness will be determined by the
application of the Golden Rule. In addition to a general test of consistency
between one's treatment of different persons (including oneself), the Golden
Rule includes-it is given specificity by-the various criteria of distributive
justice. Thus, the NCNLs could note the distributional significance of all of
the criteria of distributive justice they believe can be derived from the
Golden Rule.
II Cf. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 224 (1998) (addressing the morality of
what we owe to each other and how a plurality of values helps to determine how we justify what is owed);
ONORA O'NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL REASON
196-200 (1996) (discussing the necessary contextual and selective nature of the social good of care and
concern for others).
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In particular, it would also make sense for them to emphasize deserts
and contributions and the acceptance of risk (as, for instance, by an investor).
Perhaps, then, one might be reasonably entitled to consume (some) resources
which it is distributively just for one to possess because of one's deserts and
contributions or one's acceptance of certain risks. There will obviously be
limits: one will not deserve just whatever the market happens to provide; but
the test of reasonableness here will have to do with appropriate reward for
contribution or compensation for risk, rather than with need.
This approach would be appealing insofar as it would take into
account all of Finnis' criteria for distributive justice. It would avoid the
potentially anomalous situation in which deserts and contributions, say,
might require me to allocate resources to someone else, even though she
herself would be precluded from making personal use of them. Each of the
norms of distributive justice would help to impose limits: there would still be
a point after which wealth would be held in trust. All of the criteria implicit
in Golden Rule would be relevant to determining what could as reasonable
pursuit of genuine needs, however.
In addition to the distributional criteria generated by the Golden Rule
itself, the basic human goods will also qualify the impartiality required by
the Rule. The Golden Rule might require donation to a development NGO
rather to a college "all other things being equal." In the case Grisez
considers though, it can be plausibly argued that "[o]ther things are not
equal.' 112 The special relationship between the potential donor and the
college-which matters because acting in light of it would be to participate
in, and further the participation of others in, a variety of intelligible human
goods-would help, on Grisez's view, to make a donation to the college
reasonable. It would block the claim that possible beneficiaries of the NGO
gift were being treated unfairly were the money given to the college. It
would leave open the option of choosing either the NGO or the college as the
recipient of the donor's gift.
a. Efficiency
Grisez recognizes, plausibly enough, that genuine needs can be met
in a variety of ways: "It usually is possible to meet a genuine need more and
less conveniently and pleasantly." Given the empirical fact of other people's
12 See QUESTIONS at 438-39 (concluding "[tiherefore, on the assumptions explained previously,
you could rightly choose to donate the money for the new auditorium, just as you certainly also could
rightly carry out your tentative plan ot donate [the money] to Catholic Relief Services").
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needs, the basic principle of fairness embodied in the Golden Rule suggests
that less rather than more costly alternatives "that would meet the same need
about as well" should "be preferred.""' 3 After all, when goods are pursued
inefficiently, resources and time that could be used for the common good are
wasted; others may reasonably object that they could have benefited had one
acted with greater efficiency.
c. Consumption in the Service of the Public Weal[th?]
Some consumption decisions and some legitimate ways of fulfilling
a reasonably understood duty to use one's resources for the public good may
overlap. Perhaps this overlap could justify some consumption decisions that
might otherwise be indefensible from the perspective of the NCNLT.
While, as Finnis notes, one can fulfill the duty to make appropriate
use of resources beyond the public trust threshold by providing "grants or
loans for hospitals, schools, cultural centres, orphanages, etc., or directly for
the relief of the poor," one can also do so by "investing... [one's] surplus in
[the] production of more goods for later distribution and consumption; [or]
by providing gainful employment to people looking for work,"
'"14
(especially?) given that "wage labourers are presumptively among the poor
to whom distribution of ... [one's surplus] is owed in justice." 115
An investment will, one may hope, yield a return of one sort or
another. But will not this, too, count as part of one's surplus, and thus as ripe
for redistribution? The bulk of the return on one's investment will be apt for
reinvestment, not for consumption. So the option of fulfilling one's duties in
distributive justice in this way, while it offers an alternative to donating to
charity, does not limit one's responsibility to contribute to the public good."
16
Providing employment presents more interesting issues. For one
would have to ask both whether one could reasonably fulfill one's duty in
distributive justice here only by employing the very needy, and, more
importantly, whether one would need to fulfill one's duty by providing direct
rather than indirect employment. I think it is clear that the NCNLs believe,
plausibly enough, that the Golden Rule entails a bias in favor of aiding the
113 Id. at 808.
114 LAW at 173.
115 AQUINAS at 194 n.44. It is not clear whether one fulfills one's public responsibilities only by
providing employment for the poor; given that a grant to a cultural center might serve multiple sectors of
the population, it is unclear why one would be required to do so when providing employment. Note that
Aquinas seems to be making a more restrictive claim than Finnis, by suggesting that it is the poor, rather
than the public, to whom one's surplus is owed.
116 The assumption, here, is of course that the investment does somehow foster the public good.
Cf. QUEMSTONS at 502-07 (evaluating whether one may invest in morally tainted businesses).
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needy. If one does not have the opportunity to provide employment for the
needy with one's surplus, however, does this mean that one is precluded
from providing employment at all, and must therefore donate one's surplus
to charity.
It would not be unreasonable to argue that one would need to do so,
were it not for the fact that subsistence needs do not automatically outrank
others for the NCNLs. To be sure, "the Golden Rule requires that, other
things being equal, one use surplus resources in ways that more clearly and
certainly will meet genuine needs of deserving people in a moderate way." It
is the clarity and certainty requirements though, not the nature of the needs in
question, that leads Grisez to conclude that, "other things being equal," one
should donate to an NGO rather than to a college.
1 17
These requirements will certainly limit one's provision of
employment. All other things being equal, for instance, it might preclude
providing employment to those whose needs are already capable of being
met satisfactorily--as a means of fulfilling one's duty to make good use of
one's surplus." 
8
The same would seem to be true with respect to the indirect
provision of employment. Many routine consumption decisions do
contribute indirectly but significantly to the provision of employment for
people, including people with limited resources. Patronizing a restaurant that
features fair labor practices, for instance, may well help to ensure the
employment of low-wage members of its staff. This will be less true of some
consumption decisions, of course: if one wants to justify a purchase from an
enormous retail chain, it may be harder to appeal to the consequences of
one's choice for the economic conditions of employees. The impact will be
more diffuse, and one cannot be as certain that it will occur at all. Whether
one may see purchasing from this chain as justified because of its effects on
local employment will depend on the extent to which one must target one's
provision of employment on the most needy, the extent to which one may
reasonably provide employment indirectly as well as directly, and the extent
to which patronizing a given business is likely to facilitate employment.
It is clear that the clarity and certainty requirements impose some
limitations on attempts to fulfill one's duties of beneficence by creating
117 See id. at 438 (engaging a case involving specifics that raise real, even if not decisive, doubts
about donating to the college, and thus perhaps, not arguing that all credible and deserving NGOs merit
our support before all credible and deserving colleges, all other things being equal).
118 Even then, however, particular intelligible goods might be at stake in ways that would make it
fair for one to use one's surplus in this way.
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employment through expenditures for consumption. One might, for instance,
believe that one contributes sufficiently to job-creation and maintenance
through the expenditures one already makes in fulfillment of genuine needs.
This, in turn, will mean that giving directly to charities of whatever sort will
likely be a preferred option on the NCNL view. It is hard to see that the
NCNLs could, in principle, rule out indirect contributions to employment as
ways of fulfilling one's duty of beneficence, however.
d. Consumption as Stimulus to Productive Use of Resources
The Golden Rule might allow some expenditures on the basis
that the permissibility of such expenditures could create incentives for
the spender's productive use of resources. Recall that the second of
Finnis' twofold justifications for a system of private property is that
"natural resources, and the capital resources and consumer durables
derivable therefrom, are more productively exploited and more
carefully maintained by private enterprise, management, husbandry,
and housekeeping than by the 'officials' . . . of public enterprises...19
Also, the "availability ... [of private property] stimulates ... [the
private owner's] productivity and care." 2 In part this will doubtless
be simply because a private owner will, or may, identify more fully
with something that is uniquely her own, and care for it accordingly. It
is clear though, that Finnis recognizes that this will often be because
the private owner will realize benefits from her ownership. Finnis
notes that "if the active members of the community were more
detached from considerations of private advantage ... then common
ownership and enterprise would be more productive of benefits for
all."'' But he plausibly suggests that it is most reasonable to begin
with the characteristics of people as we find them. The fact that I am
able to consume is a valuable contributor-even if only one
contributor-to my productivity, which benefits the public. In
principle, then, someone might reason as follows: I know myself well,
and I am confident that, if I am unable to spend money on a certain
amount of consumption, I will not be as productive; I will actually be
more productive, and spend more-either through taxes or through
119 LAw at 170.
120 Id. at 173. Cf. AQUINAS at 190 (noting "the incentive-based advantages which make
ownership useful and necessary").
121 LAW at 170.
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charitable contributions-on various good causes if I know I am free
to spend more of my income (even if a smaller percentage) on
consumption as I earn more of what I make on consumption. 22  It
would be better if I were not motivated this way. However, since I am,
I need to take this into account when deciding how much I can
consume.
It is not clear to what extent this analysis can or should reasonably
figure in the deliberations of individual actors. There is doubtless some
place for this kind of reasoning in one's moral deliberation, and in the
crafting of public policy. It seems obvious, however, that thinking in this
way will often serve, if unchecked by other principles, as a license for self-
indulgence. So this kind of reasoning cannot play a central role in
determining people's redistributive responsibilities.
e. Applying the Golden Rule
The NCNLs are clear that the Golden Rule does not yield precise
answers. This is, indeed, an appealing feature of their position: they
recognize that a measure of flexibility is unavoidable. Thus, Grisez
maintains that "what one needs to live decently and meet one's
responsibilities is not rigidly fixed but somewhat elastic; very often, someone
with enough to make do could have considerably more without having an
obvious surplus or considerably less without suffering a serious deficiency";
thus "the limit defining the superfluous remains elastic, and allows what is
reasonably considered necessary at one moment to become available the next
to meet someone's unanticipated need."'123 Similarly, for Finnis, "the level of
resources which is just for owners to regard as needed ... is rather
indeterminate; in any given case much could doubtless be added, or
subtracted, leaving one still within this zone, in which owners have the prior
right to consume their own property." He emphasizes that "he true measure
of one's needs is ... the bona fide judgment of a practical reasonableness
122 Cf. THINKING at 145-168 (discussing the possible utility in Western societies of
egalitarianism-based policies for wealth redistribution, but warns against relying on any egalitarianism
argument based on intuition).
123 LIVING at 806. Grisez here expounds the view of Aquinas. Cf. AQUINAS at 193 ("Of course,
the level of resources which it is just for owners to regard as needed and not superflua is rather
indeterminate; in any given case much could doubtless be added, or subtracted, leaving one still within
this zone, in which owners have the prior right to consume their own property.").
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which includes, as always," what could effectively be described as
appropriate attention to the Golden Rule." Judgments about one's duties in
distributive justice will include concern about multiple dimensions of
responsibility, including responsibility to those who are near and dear but
also responsibility to strangers. "The incommensurability of such dimensions
defies resolution by any general rule, "with the result that, though the
relevant decisions can genuinely be in accordance with reason "reason's
'mean' here is a zone with vague boundaries rather than a point .... ,, 124
All of this is plausible and realistic, sensitive to the complexity of
moral decision-making and the unattainability of precision in many moral
matters. However, the problem with the application of the Golden Rule to
questions of justice in consumption is not just that the Rule does not yield
precise answers, but that it is not altogether evident how to use it at all to
resolve some problems in distributive justice. Grisez urges people to "apply
the Golden Rule."'125  What does this mean in a multi-person situation
though? It is not simply a matter of treating each person as an equally
deserving recipient of one's generosity. The Rule itself entails norms of
distributive justice that preclude treating all claims equally. And it treats as
reasonable departures from impartiality and equality when concern for
specific human goods renders them so. It is not clear, then, how much
guidance the requirement of fairness provides for our consumption choices.
Thus, Grisez maintains that "in some cases people ought to use more
than ten percent of their take-home pay to meet ... responsibilities [to
support church ministries], especially the responsibility to assist the poor."'
126
Wealthy parishioners should contribute considerably more than less well-off
persons to support the activities of a local diocese. However, this does not
mean that they are all required to spend no more than poorer parishioners
spend on themselves. One might choose to evaluate consumption decisions
one by one, or class by class. Alternatively, one might simply decide to
donate a specified percentage of one's income to good causes, and reevaluate
one's consumption decisions only if, on the one hand, something unexpected
makes one judge one should give less or, on the other, an individual
consumption decisions seems dubious. If one takes the latter, probably more
reasonable option, one would need to ask how to set the relevant level.
124 Cf. AQUINAS at 193-94 (footnotes omitted) (arguing that the commensuration of responsibility
should be judged by a reasonable standard rather than by a hard rules).
125 See LIVING at 811-14 (stating that the Golden Rule may be applied when determining what
duty is owed to others).
126 See QUESTIONS at 66 (maintaining further "[tihat is true not only of the very wealthy but even
of many less affluent people, at stages in their lives when financial resources significantly exceed current
and reasonably predictable needs.").
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Grisez commends a successful middle-class couple comprising a certified
public accountant and a real-estate agent that gives away 30% of its pre-tax
income, 127 and a lottery winner who will be retaining $250,000 (equivalent to
perhaps $300,000 in today's dollars) of pre-tax income each year over the
next twenty years after giving an equivalent amount to charity. 128 There is
no obvious way of assessing these choices though.
It is hard not to see some of the NCNLs' casuistic applications of the
Golden Rule to questions of consumption as arbitrary. The efficiency
requirement can certainly be employed in good faith, and the prohibition on
the pursuit of illusory goods, or of real goods with harmful intentions, will
certainly rule out many consumption decisions. However, when we ask
specifically about the fairness of individual consumption decisions, or even
classes of decisions, practical reason seems to leave many options open. If
Finnis is right that there is a zone of reasonableness here, it seems to be a
very extensive one.
3. Commitments and Vocations
Commitments and vocations might be thought to further limit the
moral reach of impartiality. Commitments to others should ordinarily be
respected on pain of unfairness; so the issue of commitment in this sense is
already addressed by the NCNLs when they note that the distributional
criteria implicit in the Golden Rule includes respect for special relationships.
Keeping commitments though, not only to specific projects but to life-plans,
is also a matter of respecting the good of self-integration, so commitments
are independently relevant to one's choices in distributive justice. If there
are vocations from God, as the NCNLs seem to believe, these will potentially
also have quite substantial effects as well on one's distributional choices.
Finnis is thoroughly critical of the "secret, often unconscious
legalism" of consequentialism, of "its assumption that there is a uniquely
correct moral answer (or specifiable set of correct moral answers) to all
genuine moral problems."'' 29 The NCNL view contrasts starkly with Singer's
consequentialism in virtue of the range of morally appropriate options it is
127 See QUESTIONS at 428-34 (evaluating the question whether "charitable giving [must] involve
an immediate personal relationship" and stating in reference to the instant givers that few people donate as
large a percentage of their income as they do to charity, but probably many who are similarly sincere,
though perhaps not so generous, have wondered about the question posed).
128 See id. at 434 (explaining what even thought the lottery winner is concerned about the tax
implication of possible donations, the winner still really cares about the well-being of those in need).
129 ETHICS at 93.
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prepared to acknowledge. Freely chosen commitments-to ourselves as well
as to others-and life-plans will likely determine, or help to determine, one's
responsibilities, and in this way will affect one's responsibilities in
distributive justice. Of course, one should select-and, as needed, modify-
a life-plan in accordance with the various norms of practical reason the
NCNLs identify, and then judge questions regarding property, wealth, and
consumption in light of this life plan. The principles of practical reason
would preclude life-plans that entailed inappropriate expenditures. One will
still have innumerable choices, however-both of and within life-plans.
Of course, our commitments will rightly shape our subsequent
choices. Coherence of character and directionality of life-plan, are plausibly
seen as goods worth affirming, goods that provide shape to our choices.
Commitments may affect our consumption choices; but they are not typically
so over-arching that everything one does can or should be subsumed under
some commitment or cluster of commitments. Unless they directly concern
consumption, they may have little direct impact on consumption choices. So
there will still be an enormous range of options for those who make
responsible commitments within the constraints of practical reasonableness
(including the Golden Rule).
The notion of commitment, not just to a specific project or program,
but to a life-plan does provide some shape to individual consumption
decisions. Life-plans (and vocations, if there are any) are highly individual
though, a fact which, again, makes then relatively unavailable as bases for
policy judgments. To be sure, however, public policy will rightly take into
account the possibility that reasonable personal life-plans will differ
dramatically, and leave open opportunities for people to pursue such plans
freely. This, in turn, will mean the implementation of a DRD at the public
policy level in a way that leaves people free to pursue alternate reasonable
life-plans.
To be sure, this assumes, as Finnis' language suggests, that we do
have vast choices among life-plans. Grisez, however, suggests that a
vocation from God-a call to do or be something in particular, which could
limit one's choices substantially-provides valuable guidance for each
person's consumption decisions. 30  Appropriate expenditures are those
needed to fulfill one's vocation.
130 Grisez develops his notion of vocation at greater length in GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL
SHAW, PERSONAL VOCATION: GOD CALLS EVERYONE BY NAME (2003). Of course, other philosophers,
both religious and secular, have explored the idea of vocation as well. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. BLUM,
MORAL PERCEPTION AND PARTICULARITY 104-10, 118-19 (1992) (defining vocation as a calling or as a
term describing what one "ought" to be); KEITH WARD, ETHICS AND CHRISTIANITY 142-47 (1970)
(discussing the various ways of interpreting vocation, for example, a vocation may be viewed as a
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A vocation might constrain one's choices in a variety of ways, and
while there will be multiple ways of fulfilling a vocation, it may rein in ones
choices, and so one's consumption decisions, significantly. It is one thing if
one must simply show that a consumption decision is consistent with a
general norm of fairness. It is quite another if one must justify every such
decision as needed to fulfill a vocation.
It is not clear that a constraining sense of vocation like this is
altogether consistent with the spirit of the NCNLs' position. Certainly, it is
difficult to see how such a conception of vocation is consistent with Finnis'
reminder that "the glory of God may ... be manifested in any of the many
aspects of human flourishing" and that "love of God may ... thus take, and
be expressed in, any of the inexhaustibly many life-plans which conform to
the requirements" of practical reason.'
31
A reasonable understanding of vocation is likely to leave many
options open. Discussing, the appropriateness of face-lift surgery,132 Grisez
maintains that such surgery may be necessary to a person's vocation because
it might facilitate a marriage or the acquisition of a job. The marriage will be
suitable, ex hypothesi, if marrying is a vocational obligation. When one asks
whether one may rightly spend the money required for a face-lift, then, one
will need to ask both whether one has a vocational responsibility to marry
and whether a face-lift is needed to fulfill this responsibility. One can hardly
guarantee that a face-lift will be a necessary condition of a new marriage or
job, however. There is no way of knowing for certain that a given job or
marriage would not have been possible absent a face-lift. Nor, it seems to
me, will one ordinarily be able to maintain that just this job or just this
marriage is itself vocationally required. Even if one has a vocation to
marriage, it will not follow that one is vocationally obligated to enter this
marriage. Our vocations, if there are any, generally leave us on a long leash.
There is a further problem here. Vocations do not trump other moral
responsibilities; God cannot give someone a vocation to behave unfairly.
The Golden Rule would still apply. For Grisez, a vocation is not imposed
arbitrarily by God. Rather, a vocational call is heard through one's
personal or nonpersonal expression of self); ADAMS, GOODS at 299-303 (1999) (describing vocation as
something other than what one does for a living, but rather what one is called to be in life).
131 LAw at 113.
132 Grisez discusses the financial implications of such surgery in his treatment of the general issue
of cosmetic surgery; see QUESTIONS at 262-66 (concluding that "only those whose personal vocation
requires it are justified in having a face-lift" and then adding that, indifferent to vocational concerns, face-
lifts are expensive and "[p]erhaps this money should be used to meet some of your own or your
dependents' current or predicatable needs").
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circumstances, temperament, and other relevant personal and situational
characteristics. Suppose, then, that Pat has a vocation to marry and judges
that a face-lift is necessary to fulfill this vocation. Chris' circumstances and
personal characteristics are, we may conclude, relevantly similar to Pat's.
Presumably, then, this means that an application of the Golden Rule would
lead one would to judge that Chris was entitled-indeed, required-to spend
money on a face-lift, even if one was unsure of Chris' person's vocation.
One would thus be committed, I think, to the judgment that Chris would be
acting in conformity with the Golden Rule when deciding to obtain a face-
lift. For, if it is fair for Pat to get the face-lift, then it seems as if it is fair for
Chris to do so as well.
If the Golden Rule permits Chris to reason in this way, however,
then it seems as if the Rule will permit anyone similarly situated, anyone
with the same sorts of personal circumstances and characteristics, to reason
in this way. Thus it is unclear what extra work the idea of vocation is doing
here. It would seem as if God were behaving arbitrarily were some people
with traits and conditions relevantly similar to Pats to receive divine
vocations when others did not. Since Grisez rejects divine command
theories of morality, we can reasonably conclude that he rejects divine
command theories of vocation. So either the Golden Rule permits all
similarly situated persons to reason in roughly the way Chris does-noting
their own similarities with others believed to have vocations, and identifying
their responsibilities with the responsibilities of these others, mutatis
mutandis--or it does not. If it does, it seems as if appeals to actions in
pursuit of intelligible human goods will almost always obviate appeals to
vocation. On the other hand, if it does not, it seems as if vocations will
impose arbitrary constraints on people's choices, something that raises
questions about the moral credibility of the notion of vocation.
In any case, the kinds of circumstances that give rise to judgments
about vocation-personal circumstances and traits-are evidently relevant,
along with one's commitments, to one's obligations in distributive justice.
Even someone who does not have a sense of vocation-perhaps her religious
beliefs do not allow for this idea to be instantiated-can still note the kinds
of circumstances, traits and commitments that might figure in a vocation, in
the shaping of a life-plan, and reasonably take these into account when
determining what consumption decisions are appropriate.
Specific commitments and vocations will entail particular
responsibilities and opportunities. Given the value of preserving
commitments and, perhaps, following vocations, we will have additional
reasons to regard certain consumables as needs. Thus, commitments and
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vocations can evidently make it appropriate to spend resources on oneself, on
particular other persons, or on causes that might not otherwise have a claim
on one. A commitment or vocation to being a musician, say (apart from any
commitment to an employer), might entail the purchase of the best
appropriate instrument for one to use. In short, commitments and vocations
further qualify the already relatively weak impartiality requirement
embodied in the Golden Rule.
Commitments and vocations will provide no particular support for
some consumption choices-a flashy sports car is not needed to fulfill one's
vocation as a surgeon-though it would not follow that such choices might
not be acceptable on other grounds. Commitments and vocations might
provide strong positive reasons against some consumption choices-a
fundraiser for a development NGO might be under a special obligation to
avoid creating the fear that gifts to the NGO were being wasted on lavish
dinners for its staff members. However, commitments and, if there are any,
vocations will add to the mix of moral factors relevant to the assessment of
consumption choices.
4. Conclusion
The NCNLs offer an account of justice in consumption that is
implicitly complex and which features a variety of applicable criteria. At its
center is a relatively expansive conception of need, with the understanding
that I am pursuing a genuine need when I reasonably participate in an
intelligible human good.
Due to the relevance of the Golden Rule's own distributive criteria,
because of the rightful place given in our deliberations to the basic human
goods, and potentially because of the relevance of vocations, it seems, that
the NCNL will not require more than a moderate version of a general duty of
aid unless no genuine human good is at stake. When the NCNLs suggest that
limits on consumption are appropriate, these are not driven by the sense, as
with Singer and Unger, that a failure to support anti-poverty programs makes
one responsible for any ills such programs fail to prevent, but might have
prevented had one's contribution been received. This would be just the sort
of consequentialist reasoning the NCNLs reject. The Golden Rule does not
require that everyone be an equal object of the agent's active concern, nor
does it lead to the equation of acts and omissions. The NCNLs' view that
distributive justice requires the redistribution of surplus wealth is not a
consequence of the fact that such redistribution could benefit the worst-off.
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For recall Finnis' observation that allocation of surplus resources to "cultural
centres" would be appropriate. The NCNLs' arguments against particular
consumption choices will not be egalitarian or consequentialist, even if they
do presuppose a general duty to provide aid to others. Rather, the issue with
respect to any consumption choice will be the inherent unreasonableness of
purchasing goods or services that are not genuine needs. This, in turn, will
depend on whether a given purchase involves participation in an authentic
good and whether one's pursuit of that good is efficient, fair, and consistent
with one's vocation and commitments.
Thus, Grisez agrees that the (substantial) portion of a windfall lottery
winning which the winner proposes to give away could reasonably be given
to an NGO, to a college, or to both. 13 3 His out-and-out rejection of some
consumption choices-regularly dining at high-end restaurants, taking
pleasure cruises, vacationing at posh South Pacific resorts-is best
understood as a consequence of the view that such choices (a) do not involve
the pursuit of genuine goods or (b) involve the pursuit of such goods in
inefficient ways-because less costly choices could achieve more or less the
same (legitimate) ends. The pleasure cruise might be thought not to meet
any genuine needs-not to qualify as participation in any intelligible human
good. The high-end dinner might be thought to involve participation in one
or more goods in which one could participate without meaningful loss at
significantly lower cost. Even were everyone in the entire world to enjoy the
standard of living available to contemporary residents of Norway and
Sweden, the NCNLs would, I think, still object to consumption decisions that
did not meet genuine needs. They would still likely argue that private
owners were responsible for redistributing their surplus in ways that might
foster the public good.
C. An Example: Fine Wines and Salon Concerts
Finnis implicitly treats some expenditures on fine wines and salon
concerts as acceptable on his account of distributive justice. It is not
altogether clear how he reaches the conclusion that they are acceptable, but
examining it in light of the criteria of justice in distribution he elaborates will
help to clarify these criteria and to suggest how he might approach the
question of justifying or criticizing a given consumption choice.
133 See QUESTIONS at 434-39 (evaluating the possible uses of a man's ten-million-dollar, lottery
jackpot, including the idea that the money is given to a college "not for an auditorium" but instead for
programs that educate and develop service-minded, college graduates).
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1. Finnis' Implicit Legitimation of (Some) Fine Wines and Salon
Concerts
Finnis emphasizes that "what is unjust about large disparities of
wealth in a community is not the inequality as such but the fact that (as the
inequality suggests) the rich have failed to redistribute that portion of their
wealth which could be better used by others for the realization of basic
values in their own lives."'134 So far, it might seem, despite the overt concern
with "large disparities," that Finnis thinks the new classical natural law view
requires individuals to redistribute their wealth up to the point at which
everyone's basic needs are met.135 However, this does not seem to be quite
what he understands his view to imply.
If redistribution means no more than that more beer is going to be
consumed morosely before television sets by the relatively many, and
less fine wine consumed by the relatively few at salon concerts by
select musicians, then it can scarcely be said to be a demand of justice.
But if redistribution means that, at the expense of the wine, etc., more
people can be preserved from (non-self-inflicted) illness, educated to
the point where genuine self-direction becomes possible for them,
defended against the enemies of justice, etc., then such redistribution is
a requirement of justice.'
36
Since distributive justice is a duty of individuals, which the state
may help them to fulfill, rather than simply a duty of the political
community, it is unlikely that Finnis means in this passage that state
redistribution might leave some resources for the wine, the concerts, and the
musicians, even though individuals themselves would have a duty to part
with the money required to fund these things. Rather, the redistribution in
the interests of education, culture, and defense to which Finnis refers would
first and foremost be the duty of individuals, even if it might be effected
through redistributive schemes organized by the state. In any case, Finnis
does not suggest that the redistribution required to ensure that these needs are
met will entail the absence of fine wines, salon concerts, or select musicians.
Absent a system of public provision vastly superior to the one currently in
134 LAW at 174.
135 Though note that "basic values" here means the same as "basic goods," and so includes not just
the rudiments of human existence but also includes, for instance, speculative knowledge and aesthetic
experience.
136 LAw at 174 (emphasis added).
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place, needs for healthcare, education, security, and so forth will persist;
even in well-ordered societies, there will be gaps and deficiencies-unmet
needs. Nonetheless, the NCNLT evidently does not entail that wine and the
concerts be foresworn until these needs are met. There will be less wine,
fewer concerts, but not none.
2. Using the NCNLs' Criteria to Assess the Wine and Concerts
How, then, using the NCNLs' criteria, might we determine whether,
and, if so, when spending money on a salon concert like this might be
appropriate?
a. The Authenticity of the Goods at Issue
The salon concert Finnis describes will offer, at minimum, the
opportunity to participate in the authentic good of aesthetic experience.
There is no question then, that the relevant good is genuine. It may also
provide opportunities to participate in other authentic goods, including
friendship (it may serve as an occasion for connecting friends), and
speculative knowledge (perhaps one is curious about the aptness of
performances that purport to employ authentic instruments and techniques).
Money spent on the concert will involve participation in one or more
authentic goods, which will, in virtue of their authenticity, have crossed the
first hurdle they must surmount to count as genuine needs.
b. Consistency with the Golden Rule
If there is a general duty of aid, it follows from the Golden Rule.
Specific norms of distributive justice obtain to the extent, largely, that they
are derivable from the Rule (basic goods like friendship may be relevant
here, as well). The requirement of efficiency follows, in large part, from the
Rule. Arguments for the legitimacy of particular instances of consumption
based on various kinds of public benefits (including the incentivization of the
consumer) will make sense to the extent that they flow from the Rule. So the
most pressing question for anyone attempting to operationalize the NCNLT
will be just how much guidance the Golden Rule actually offers.
The envisioned salon concert itself does not pose an obvious
difficulty with reference to the Golden Rule or the other relevant moral
criteria. There is nothing generally unfair about performing or listening to
music, though one could doubtless create a detailed scenario in which this
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was the case. The question, then, would be whether a DRD precluded
expenditures on such events as unfair. It appears that a general duty of aid
could leave resources available to support such concerts; supporting them
could be consistent with the requirement that one participate in authentic
goods efficiently; supporting them could be a means of usefully
redistributing one's resources to others; and one might leave oneself free to
support such concerts because one's freedom to do so could help to
incentivize one to be productive-and so have more to give others.
i. The general duty of aid.
Giving consistently and significantly to good causes at the moderate
level envisioned in connection with a general duty of aid like that referred to
by Finnis and George does not eliminate the resources needed to fund some
salon concerts. Since giving in this way will reduce one's discretionary
income by a meaningful amount, it will, of course, entail a reduction in the
number of such concerts one might reasonably pay to attend than if one did
not give to good causes. It will, however, leave resources available for
cultural activities. One will need to evaluate one's overall consumption
patterns, and not simply particular choices in isolation. One will then have to
inquire whether one is pursuing the genuine needs in question fairly,
applying the Golden Rule in a fairly general way.
ii. Specific nonns of distributive justice.
The appropriateness of expenditures on salon concerts will further be
affected by the criteria for distributive justice implicit in the Golden Rule.
The principle that deserts and contributions should be rewarded might justify
some discretionary expenditures on oneself. Special responsibilities to
friends or to the concert venue might be distributionally relevant-or, of
course, to channel expenditures in other directions. Absent special
responsibilities, the NCNLs' principles of distributive justice probably need
not be thought to rule out expenditures on the concerts: some expenditures
on such events, absent extravagant expenditures elsewhere, could be fair.
iii. Efficiency.
It is reasonable to ask here whether an expensive salon concert
would, in fact, represent an efficient participation in the good of aesthetic
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experience. Might not a (less expensive) mass public concert provide a
similar experience? What about a recorded concert? Here, there can be no
general answer. In some cases, the experience will not be the same because
it is fundamentally social-attending the concert is a meaningful experience
to be shared with friends. This is likely to be superior to the experience of
sitting in one's living room with the same friends listening to a CD; the
aesthetics of the experience may add to the intimate bond with one's friends
in a way that distinguishes the experience from attendance at a mass concert.
The acoustics of the salon environment may also enhance the sound quality
of the performance. Further, the opportunity to meet and talk with the
musicians may add significantly to the experience. One might, then, judge in
good faith that for these reasons the salon concert was not a less efficient
way of participating in the same general way in the good of aesthetic
experience as a mass public concert or a "concert" in one's living room.
However, there is no guarantee that this would be the case. It is perfectly
possible that one's decision to go to the event rather than enjoying a
performance at home might be motivated simply by the desire to see and be
seen. One's desire to engage in conspicuous consumption would not give
one any reason to pay to attend the concert.
iv. Public benefit through consumption.
The second-order effects of sponsoring and attending salon concerts
might be morally relevant here as well. Perhaps it is reasonable to assume
that the occurrence of such concerts will have a positive cultural spillover
effect. If no one attended such concerts, the argument might run, less first-
rate music would be performed and fewer select musicians would be trained.
The overall availability of good music would be reduced. Thus persons with
less money, unable to attend salon concerts, would themselves be adversely
affected by the unavailability-in larger public settings or by way of
recordings-of music that might otherwise be accessible to them.
Of course, one might argue that those able to afford such concerts
should be expected to contribute to the support of more accessible public
performances. If they can afford these concerts, they can certainly afford to
support performers and performances in ways that would facilitate wider
access to good music more directly. A defender of the concerts might
respond that small concerts are vital if unknown performers are to develop
the skill and reputation needed to make them effective contributors to the
aesthetic experiences of larger publics. Perhaps these smaller concerts
would, of necessity, be more expensive because each member of a smaller
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audience would need to pay more for a concert if appearing at the concert
were to be financially viable for the musicians involved. All this is relatively
speculative though. The cost of the concert, even if legitimate, does not
explain the legitimacy of expenditures on the fine wine, which Finnis seems
to grant.
Of course, by supporting a salon concert, one is doing more than
simply feeding the wider culture: one is impacting the lives of particular
persons. One is doubtless providing employment for the musicians, for the
salon staff, and for others as a result of one's paid attendance at such an
event. However, little of the money generated by the attendance fees for the
concert will likely contribute to the well-being of many members of the salon
staff, and perhaps even of the musicians.
Helping to fund the salon concert is certainly a matter of fostering
the common good, and not simply a matter of purely private consumption.
How relevant this will be to determining whether consumption choices that
would otherwise be distributively unjust would be permissible will depend
on a careful Golden Rule analysis.
v. Stimulating one's own productivity.
Perhaps the Golden Rule might leave people free to consume some
resources-by, for instance, organizing and attending salon concerts by
select musicians-in ways that might be locally inefficient but globally
efficient. The freedom to consume in this way might spur people to greater
productivity. However, again, it is unclear to what extent it could be
reasonable to make such considerations central in deliberations about one's
own consumption choices.
c. Commitments and Vocations
Commitments and vocations, in the sense in which Grisez and Finnis
discuss them (emphasizing their open-endedness and generality), are unlikely
in general to determine whether one should or should not pay to attend a
salon concert featuring performances by select musicians. It is possible, of
course, that one might make a commitment to a particular occupation or
relationship that might make attendance at such events especially important
(as a means of fulfilling occupational responsibilities or solidifying a
relationship) or inappropriate (perhaps because one's vocation involves
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expressive opposition to conspicuous consumption). Such cases are likely to
be rare though.
d. The Moral Status of Salon Concerts
The NCNLT does not make it easy to determine whether-and, if so,
why-it is reasonable to spend money on Finnis' salon concerts. They
certainly seem to meet genuine needs, and they are probably not as such
inconsistent with the Golden Rule. A plausible general duty of aid would
certainly leave resources available for such concerts, as would, perhaps,
distributive justice as understood by the NCNLT. Less clear is whether the
envisioned concert would be an efficient pursuit of the relevant goods.
Individual commitments and vocations might make staging or attending the
concert especially appropriate or especially inappropriate. They might be
justified in part because of the employment they provide directly and
indirectly, and the fact that they contribute indirectly to making something of
value available to the wider public. It is hard to see that, in general, one
could justify much in the way of expenditure on such events on the grounds
that one would be less productive if unable to consume salon concerts-
while psychologically apt up to a point, this kind of reasoning seems prone to
abuse. Attending Finnis' concerts is probably consistent with the Golden
Rule, and certainly could be consistent with the requirements imposed by at
least some people's commitments and vocations. Whether this is so will
depend largely on how we understand and apply the Golden Rule.
D. Conclusion
The NCNLs offer a range of casuistic judgments about consumption.
While the rationales for these judgments are not always clear, what is clear is
that they believe their theoretical position grounds a commitment to
moderation and a rejection of extravagance as unfair. Their understanding of
consumption reflects what I interpret as three related requirements: that our
consumption choices involve the pursuit of authentic goods; that our
participation in these goods be fair, and so in accordance with the Golden
Rule (and thus be, among other things, efficient); and that we adhere
appropriately to our commitments and, if there are any, our vocations. The
application of these criteria leaves questions on the table regarding the
appropriateness of particular choices-as, for instances, the choice to pay to
attend one of Finnis' salon concerts. In particular, the NCNLT gives little
guidance regarding the employment of the Golden Rule to identify conduct
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as fair or unfair in specific cases. It is clear, however, that their arguments
would likely ground a meaningful duty to give away resources to serve the
common good-in fulfillment of both a general duty of aid and a duty to
give away resources to which one lacked entitlement in distributive justice.
IV. Conclusion
The NCNLs are intensely morally serious. They oppose nuclear
deterrence and capital punishment 137 as well as abortion. And they clearly
recognize that duties to care for the vulnerable do not stop at national
borders. Indeed, international justice is clearly a mandate of the NCNLT.
Indeed, it is so clear that, while he is the most politically conservative of the
NCNLs, Robert P. George has committed himself to the proposition that the
establishment of some kind of world government is a morally important
goal.
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It is not surprising, then, that the NCNLT would ground a significant
DRD. The theory does not entail the conclusion (what sort of plausible
theory would?) that everyone should contribute an identical, specifiable
percentage of her income to international relief and development efforts, or
that one employ the same algorithm to determine how much one should
give. 139  It does entail, however, that one has a responsibility to give a
significant portion of one's wealth to serve the common good-either
personally or through the tax system.
For the NCNLs, the Golden Rule entails a clear responsibility to
provide assistance to those whom one could easily help. This is a
requirement that governs all of our actions, but it clearly allows considerable
flexibility. What counts as the easy provision of assistance will obviously
137 Finnis defends capital punishment in Fundamentals of Ethics but rejects it as illicit in his more
recent study of Aquinas. Compare ETHIcS at 130, 135 (reasoning that, though capital punishment is not
required, it "need not be regarded as doing evil that good may come of it"), with AQUINAS at 279-84, 293
(describing Aquinas' rejection of the defense of capital punishment that "it need not inolve the intent
precisely to kill as a means or as an end" and acknowledging Finnis' new-found agreement with that
reasoning).
138 See DEFENSE at 228-45 (emphasizing that a "world government... [should be] limited in the
scope of its just authority by the principle of subsidiarity, and ... that such [a] government must refrain
from displacing national governments ... or interfering with the exercise of their authority in matters
within their competence."). George also states, however, that "the tradition of natural law theorizing does
not suppose that a nation may justly fail to submit to the jurisdiction of a just world government which has
been, or is being, created in accordance with basically just procedures." Id. at 241. Grisez seems to take a
similar view, see LIVING at 868-69.
139 Cf. LIAM MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN NON-IDEAL THEORY (2000) (discussing the moral
demands of individuals and society under the principle of beneficence).
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vary from person to person and from situation to situation. A reasonable
interpretation of this implication of the Golden Rule seems to suggest that
most people in the developed world have some duty to contribute resources
in ways that will benefit the common good, and this will often mean
fulfilling a DRD, in particular.
The NCNLs clearly want to argue for more than this though. There
is a significant duty of beneficence that extends beyond the provision of
minimal aid (or else, alternatively, which specifies the meaning of minimal
aid in a highly robust fashion). For the NCNLs are clear that one is obligated
to give away wealth that is not being used, or to be used, in reasonable
pursuit of intelligible human goods.
This alone may not rule out many consumption choices (even if one
takes the NCNLs' somewhat restrictive view of what counts as an intelligible
human good). The NCNLs' view entails further limitations on consumption
decisions though. Most importantly, basic goods must be pursued
efficiently. Someone who is not committed to being a collector' 4° might
reasonably buy a print of a painting-thus furthering one's participation, and
the participation of others, in the good of aesthetic experience. If there are
multiple print sizes, one might reasonably ask whether one could reasonably
be thought to want a version of the print that was, say, twenty percent higher
and wider than one might otherwise purchase because of any meaningful
aesthetic value. If one did not, one would not be justified in buying it, even
if doing so might further participation in an intelligible human good. Or
suppose one frequents a coffee house as a comfortable place in which to
write and think, or to socialize. If one goes there out of force of habit, when
one needs neither to write and think nor to socialize, then one will either
need another reason to patronize it in this instance, or one will not be acting
out of genuine need.
The Golden Rule will constrain redistributive duties in another way.
The general norms of distributive justice will make it obligatory to respect
certain claims of particular others or of groups potentially affected by one's
actions. One will be obligated to respect these norms before fulfilling any
more general duties of beneficence. Similarly, the claims of other human
goods will constrain one's duties of beneficence. As was clear in Grisez's
discussion of the choice between donating to a college and an NGO, the
demands of fairness are shaped by intelligible goods. The existence of
intelligible goods-singled by factors including pre-existing special
relationships and the opportunity to honor a deceased spouse-can give one
140 Some people evidently can and should be collectors. Cf. QUESTIONS at 839-44 (asking the
question: "Should morality limit public funding of the arts?").
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an intelligible reason for not treating all of the potential beneficiaries of
one's actions as equals. In addition, prior commitments will constrain one's
choices. Adhering those commitments will render needful expenditures that
might not otherwise be so. Finally, the duty of beneficence need not be
fulfilled by giving to charities (whether or not ones that focus on meeting the
most pressing of human needs). It might be fulfilled through investments or
through the provision of employment, in ways that might substitute for or
simultaneously constitute consumption decisions.
The aptness of all this will depend primarily on how effectively and
sensitively we can understand and apply the Golden Rule. The NCNLs make
particular, casuistic judgments about fairness. They acknowledge how
relatively imprecise the Rule's requirement of fairness can be though. The
viability of the NCNLT as a source of meaningful moral guidance regarding
consumption is a function of our ability to determine responsibly what we
ourselves would and would not find acceptable were we to trade places with
others affected by our choices--once we have taken into account the other
implications of the Golden Rule and the implications, if any, of our
commitments and vocations, as well as the genuineness of the goods in
question.
This is no easy task. The greatest weakness of the NCNLs' account
of the morality of consumption is arguably their failure to explain how to
apply the Golden Rule in a meaningful way. However, it does seem clear the
NCNLT will not require anything like the self-oblation required, in theory,
by the Singer-Unger view. It nonetheless entails significant commitments by
most people in the developed world to providing financial support for
poverty relief efforts (or other endeavors designed to foster the common
good). The NCNLT does not, per se, require a particular allocation of this
wealth. Indeed, it leaves open a wide range of options. For a use of the
public's redistributive authority to foster relief and development efforts to be
just, however, it is not necessary that this use be the only one consistent with
justice. If a redistributive scheme benefiting relief and development efforts
is democratically legitimate, it will. count as one way of implementing a more
general duty of redistribution required by the NCNLT.
Some proponents of a DRD may not regard this as sufficient. For,
they will ask, what if the state makes otherwise appropriate use of its
redistributive authority, but choose to support only charities that promote
cultural enrichment? What if it employs this authority simply to benefit
those who are already well-off? Is there any basis on which the state's action
in this case could be characterized as unjust?
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I believe the NCNLs would say that it could and should be. For
while any particular individual might without committing injustice choose to
devote much or all of her surplus to cultural enrichment, the same would not
be true of the state. The individual and collective cases are not analogous.
First, negatively, while individual identities and commitments may channel
private resources into purely cultural channels, the state has no identity, has
made and could make no commitments, precluding concern for poor.
Certainly this would be particularly true with respect to the poor within its
borders, who are, of course, members of the community for which it is
responsible. The state's identity could hardly preclude care for its own
constituents. Second, positively, the Golden Rule would rule out as unfair
both disregard for the domestic poor and for neighbors beyond the state's
borders. Just as the Golden Rule requires individuals to assist those who can
be easily helped, it similarly binds states. It will also, of course, condemn as
unjust, and thus to be renounced, those international legal, political, and
economic structures that create and perpetuate poverty. The NCNLT has no
commitment to a naive view in accordance with which the challenge of
global poverty confronts societies the disparities in whose material
conditions are exclusively or primarily accidental.
In the absence of a global government, this will obviously be the
responsibility of individual states.' 4 1 However, as George emphasizes, the
NCNLT makes the creation of an appropriate system of global governance
morally desirable and the exercise of just authority by such a system just.
Global poverty will often be a global problem. A global solution will
include a fairer distribution of burdens. The global structures and rules,
which can be more readily and fairly altered by a world government than by
individual nations, can have substantial positive and negative consequences
for global poverty. Thus, global poverty will be a key focus of a global
government if one exists.
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The NCNLT provides a comprehensive framework within which
questions about individual and collective responsibility for responding to the
awful spectacle of global deprivation can be addressed. By elaborating a
systematic understanding of justice in the acquisition and distribution of
property and the provision of assistance to others, it simultaneously mandates
individual and collective assistance (among other appropriate remedies) and
cabins individual duties of aid within reasonable limits. Thus, it provides an
141 George notes the natural law tradition's emphasis on "the obligation of states to cooperate to
solve common problems and provide assistance to one another." DEFENSE at 244 n.32.
142 Cf. Gary Chartier, Peoples or Persons? Revising Rawls on Global Justice, 27 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 1 (2004) (examining John Rawls' account of global distributive justice).
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attractive and morally credible setting within which a DRD effectuated by
way of public policy can be clarified and defended.

